

# Underemployment and the Business Cycle

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## **Abstract**

Recent years have seen a renewed interest in involuntary part-time employment. Despite its sizeable share in measures of resource underutilization in the labor market, our understanding of this phenomenon has remained limited. In this paper I analyze both household-level and aggregate data to characterize involuntary part-time employment in the US, and document its business cycle properties. I develop a tractable model of involuntary part-time employment, featuring search and matching frictions and partial substitutability between full-time and part-time workers in the production function, that successfully captures the dynamics of

*“[The] unemployment rate today probably does not fully capture the extent of slack in the labor market.”*

— Janet Yellen, *Providence Chamber of Commerce, May 2015*

## 1 Introduction

In recent years researchers and policymakers have shown a renewed interest in involuntary part-time employment as a crucial element to assess labor market health. The fact that individuals have part-time jobs even though they would be willing to work more

certain economic conditions, without necessarily changing effective headcounts and thus avoiding the potential costs associated to firing workers. Given the benefits and costs associated with this reallocation and the characteristics of the workers who are reallocated, this adjustment is more than a mere reduction in hours to existing workers, and thus part-time employment emerges as an alternative adjustment mechanism, different from the traditional intensive and extensive margins.

The second observation is that wages of involuntary part-time workers display a higher volatility and lower persistence than those of their full-time counterparts, thus indicating a higher degree of flexibility. This will turn out to be a key element in explaining the countercyclicality of involuntary part-time employment.

Based on this evidence, I build a business cycle model of involuntary part-time employment, featuring search and matching frictions, where the decision of whether a worker is full-timer or part-timer is entirely made by the firm. It is an augmented search and matching model of the labor market, which features full-time and part-time employment, and a production function that combines both types of workers. The model thus depicts individuals in three labor-market states: employment as full-timer, employment as part-timer and search unemployment. Individuals search and are hired as full-time employees. However, in a given period the firm may decide to reallocate part of the workforce towards part-time contracts in response to an aggregate shock that negatively affects its profits. When reallocated as part-timers, workers see their working hours reduced and stop receiving fringe benefits. If laid off, they receive unemployment benefits and face a probability less than one of finding a new job.

This model is able to deliver the countercyclicality of involuntary part-time employment found in the data. The key mechanism to obtain this result is the relatively higher flexibility of part-time wages, a feature from the data, that makes it more profitable for the firm to reallocate workers from full-time to part-time contracts during recessions. In addition, the model successfully captures the empirical dynamic comovements between output, unemployment and involuntary part-time employment.

Based on the model, I do policy analysis to evaluate the effect of changes in fringe benefits on involuntary part-time employment. The model predicts that an increase in mandatory fringe benefits to full-time workers, such that their share in average full-time wages goes up by 1 percentage point, leads to an increase of the steady state involuntary part-time ratio by 16 percent, from 4 percent to 4.65 percent. The increase in fringe benefits not only has a direct effect on the incentives of the firm to reallocate workers from full-time to part-time positions, but also has an



worker-specific skills and job-related skills (i.e. productivity endowment) account for much of the part-time wage disadvantage. There are also papers analyzing the investment in human capital by part-time workers. [Becker \(1964\)](#) postulates that part-time workers have lower incentives to invest in their human capital, while [Maximiano \(2012\)](#) finds that workers' training probability increases with the number of contractual work hours.

to full-time jobs, and to easily upgrade the number of hours worked once the demand conditions improve.

Other studies for the US, such as [Cajner et al. \(2014\)](#) and [Valletta and Van Der List \(2015\)](#),

than reallocating her.

The paper most related to mine is [Warren \(2015\)](#). He also conceives involuntary part-time employment as a decision made exclusively by the firm. However, differently from my representative firm model with heterogeneous workforce, he constructs a model in which heterogeneous firms choose to allocate identical workers either into full- or part-time positions. With his model he is able to match the patterns of vacancies and new hires across the growth distribution of firms. In addition, he produces results for the cross-section of firms that employ part-time workers; however, given the lack of data availability on part-time employment at the firm level, the author cannot test these predictions. He also reports business cycle statistics obtained from the model that are able to capture the countercyclicality of involuntary part-time employment.

Finally, within the literature studying short-time work (STW) programs as the ones developed in Europe, particularly in Germany, a paper that is close to mine in terms of its setup is [Balleer et al. \(2013\)](#). These authors construct a search and matching model with endogenous separations to study the effect of STW on unemployment dynamics. Their main finding is that STW programs act as automatic stabilizers, saving jobs during recessions. The modeling strategy in this paper is based on defining two endogenous cutoffs associated to the decisions of firing a worker or of participating in the STW program. I adopt the idea of finding optimal cutoffs but implement it in a model with involuntary part-time employment that resembles more the US reality, where the development of STW programs is very limited, than the European reality.

## Empirical Facts

### .1 Business Cycles

Table 1 presents empirical facts regarding underemployment in the U.S., with particular focus on involuntary part-time employment. Using data from the BLS, I compute business-cycle statistics for involuntary part-time employment, full-time employment, the involuntary part-time ratio<sup>2</sup>, and underutilization measured as U6.

The results show that involuntary part-time employment is very volatile, nearly as volatile as unemployment, and strongly countercyclical. The opposite is true for full-time employment. Both series display a high degree of persistence. The broad measure of underutilization is also very





developed by

**Table 3: Transition Probabilities In and Out of Involuntary**



Table 4: Wages at Business Cycle Frequencies

	Relative Std. Dev.	Autocorrelation
Aggregate wage	0.412	0.843
CPS – <i>all workers</i>	0.369	0.933
CPS – <i>FT workers</i>	0.479	0.912
CPS – <i>IPT workers</i>	1.101	0.845

Notes: The statistics correspond to the period 1995q1-2015q12. The aggregate wage corresponds to hourly compensation in the private non-farm business sector from the Labor Productivity and Costs program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Hourly wages from the CPS, for each of the groups considered, are composition-bias corrected averages for workers in the private non-farm business sector, between 25 and 60 years old, excluding supervisory workers. All series

of economic distress.

Figure (10) shows that a very large fraction of involuntary part-time wages in 2006 were above the minimum wage. Only 5 percent of the individuals reported having an hourly wage equal or less than the minimum hourly wage. The median difference in 2006 was of about \$5, which is significant taking into account that the state with the highest minimum wage had an hourly minimum wage of \$7.63. This evidence is consistent with the survey results from [Van Horn and Zukin \(2015\)](#), who find that more than 60 percent of the involuntary part-time workers who were surveyed are paid above the minimum wage.

When I compare the distribution of the gap in 2006 to the one in 2009, it is clear that the distribution shifts to the left, implying that wages for involuntary part-timers declined in the context of the Great Recession. In 2009, there is a larger mass of individuals earning a wage at or below the minimum wage than the one in 2006. This is evidence that firms had scope to reduce wages, and that minimum wages were not imposing a bound on firms.

In this context, it is worth noting that more than 80 percent of involuntary part-time workers are paid by the hour, while the majority of full-time workers are salaried workers. There is also empirical evidence that salaries might be stickier than hourly wages ([Barattieri et al., 2010](#)). This would be suggestive of a lower degree of rigidity in part-time wages relative to full-time wages.

## 4 Model

### 4.1 Decentralized Economy

The model I present in this section is a real business cycle model that features search and matching frictions in the labor market, which impede transitions of individuals from search unemployment to employment. The distinctive feature of my model is that workers can have either full-time or part-time status, and production combines both types of workers. The model thus depicts individuals in three labor-market states: employment as full-timer, employment as part-timer and search unemployment. I abstract from labor force participation decisions on the part of households. They are assumed to supply work inelastically in the sense that all its unemployed members are sent to search for jobs each period.

In this paper I focus on part-time employment for economic reasons, i.e. workers who would like to work as full-timers but that actually work as part-timers due to slack business conditions.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> This paper is based on the author's unpublished working paper, "The Role of Minimum Wages in the Labor Market," available at [http://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/20130201a.pdf](#).

Individuals search and are hired as full-time employees. However, in a given period the firm may decide to reallocate part of the workforce towards part-time contracts in response to a shock that negatively affects its profits.

#### 4.1.1 Labor Market

The labor market is characterized by matching frictions. Unemployed workers search for full-time jobs at no cost and firms pay a cost to post vacancies. Matching between unemployed individuals and vacancies occurs randomly according to an aggregate matching function:

$$m(v_t, s_t) = \mu s_t v_t^{1-\xi}, \quad (1)$$


where  $s_t$  is the measure of workers searching for a job and  $v_t$  is the aggregate number of vacancies during period  $t$ . The parameter  $\xi$  denotes the elasticity of job matches with respect to search unemployment, and  $\mu$  is the matching efficiency parameter. Finally, the labor market tightness,  $\theta_t$  is defined as the vacancy-unemployment ratio,  $v_t/s_t$ . The probability that an unemployed individual is matched to an open vacancy at date  $t$  is denoted  $p_t = m_t/s_t$ . Similarly, the probability that any open vacancy is matched with a searching worker at date  $t$  is  $q_t = m_t/v_t$ . Households and firms take these probabilities as given. New hires,  $m(v_t, s_t)$ , begin working with a one-period delay.

Even though individuals search for full-time positions and are hired as full-time employees, when the jobs become operative in the following period the firm may choose to turn some full-time contracts into part-time contracts. This reallocation decision depends on the realization of the job-specific idiosyncratic productivity,  $z_{it}$ , that is drawn from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f.  $F(z)$ , which has positive support and density  $f(z)$ . If the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity falls below  $\tilde{z}_t$ , then the job is destroyed and worker and firm separate. This leads to a job destruction rate  $F(\tilde{z}_t)$ . Alternatively, if the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity is higher than  $\tilde{\tilde{z}}_t$ , the individual remains as a full-time worker, i.e. under the conditions she was originally hired. Finally, if the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity falls between the two endogenously determined critical thresholds  $\tilde{z}_t$  and  $\tilde{\tilde{z}}_t$ , it would be optimal for the firm to turn the full-time job into a part-time job. The resulting full-time/part-time reallocation rate is  $F(\tilde{\tilde{z}}_t) - F(\tilde{z}_t)$ . The optimal cutoffs are represented in Figure 11. Besides the previously described

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t → Ennot n Fut o Hor t s o pon nt s u s F r r pr s nt n F out F t r o tot F  
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us n ss on t ons r or I o us on t Et r

Figure 1: Timing of Events



time (normalized to 1) to full-time jobs, while part-time jobs involve only  $\bar{h} < 1$  hours. Each job  $i$  produces  $A_t z_{it}$  units of output if it is full-time and  $A_t z_{it} \bar{h}$  units of output if it is part-time, where  $A_t$  denotes aggregate productivity and  $z_{it}$  denotes job-specific idiosyncratic productivity.

Total output is the aggregation of full-time and part-time output by means of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregator:

$$Y_t = \alpha Y_t^F + (1 - \alpha) Y_t^P \quad /$$







subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints

$$c_t + b_t = (1 - \tau^n) W_t + [1 - n_t + n_t F(\tilde{z}_t)] \chi + R_t b_{t-1} + d_t. \quad (12)$$

The subjective discount factor is  $\beta$ , and the function  $u(\cdot)$  is a standard strictly-increasing and strictly-concave utility function over consumption. There is no labor force participation decision in this problem. Since the reallocation and firing decision are only made by the firm, the workers have no control over their employment status and take as given the reallocation and firing thresholds,  $\tilde{z}_t$  and  $\tilde{z}_t$ .

The total pre-tax wage income is  $W_t$ , defined as in equation (6)

In Section 3 I present evidence that part-time wages are more flexible than full-time wages. In order to capture this with the model, I assume that full-time wages are sticky by introducing a partially smoothed wage of the following form:

$$w_t^F = \omega w_t^{F,NB} + (1 - \omega) w_{ss}^{F,NB}, \quad (14)$$

where  $w_t^{F,NB}$  is the full-time Nash-bargaining wage negotiated in period- $t$ ,  $w_{ss}^{F,NB}$  is the full-time Nash-bargaining wage in the deterministic steady state, and  $\omega \in (0, 1)$  measures the degree of stickiness. The smaller is  $\omega$ , the stickier are full-time wages.

Part-time workers are just paid the Nash-bargaining wage negotiated in period- $t$ , i.e.

$$w_t^P = w_t^{P,NB}. \quad (15)$$

The derivation of the Nash bargaining  $w$ )

wage is negotiated might have a low realization of her idiosyncratic productive and might be fired.

#### 4.1.5 Government

Unemployment benefits are provided by the government. The government runs a balanced budget and finances the unemployment insurance system by collecting labor income taxes and issuing real state-contingent debt. The period- $t$  government budget constraint is thus

$$[1 - n_t + n_t F(\tilde{z}_t)] \chi + R_t b_{t-1} = \tau^n W_t + b_t, \quad (18)$$

where  $W_t$  is defined as in equation (6).

#### 4.1.6 Equilibrium

The equilibrium in this economy is made up of endogenous processes  $c_t, v_t, n_{t+1}, \tilde{z}_t, \tilde{\tilde{z}}_t, w_t^F, w_t^P, R_t, b_t$   $\infty_{t=0}$  that, given the stochastic processes  $\{z_t, A_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and the initial stock of workers  $n_0$ , satisfy:

1. The household's consumption-saving optimality condition (13).
2. The firm's optimality conditions (8), (9) and (10).
3. The wage equations (16) and (17).

First of all, moving to the standard model requires discarding part-time employment, which occurs as long as  $\tilde{z}_t = \hat{z}_t = \tilde{z}_t$ . When the firing and reallocation thresholds are the same, total output is just given by

$$Y_t = \alpha^{1/\varepsilon} A_t n_t \int_{\tilde{z}_t}^{\infty} z f(z) dz, \quad (20)$$

which implies that the contribution of the marginal worker to output is  $\alpha^{1/\varepsilon} A_t z_t$ .

The two critical thresholds for reallocation and firing defined by equations (9) and (10) are the same as long as the following condition holds:

$$\alpha^{1/\varepsilon} A_t \hat{z}_t - w_t^F(\hat{z}_t) - \zeta + 1 - \rho^F \frac{g'(v_t)}{q_t} = -\phi.$$

Given the full-time wage in equation (14), and assuming complete flexibility (i.e.  $\omega = 1$ ), this condition defines the reallocation threshold under which

and reallocation cut-offs:

$$\tilde{z}_t = 1$$

benefits, i.e. higher  $\zeta$



wages. If this is the case, then  $|\frac{\partial z_A}{\partial A}|$  is unambiguously negative. In other words, the magnitude of the elasticity of the reallocation cutoff with respect to aggregate productivity is larger when full-time wages are more sticky. This implies that, when full-time wages are stickier, a higher reallocation towards part-time would take place than in the case of complete flexibility of wages.

This result is indicative of the relevance of wage stickiness in shaping the reallocation decision. However, in my model there are other elements in place – e.g. structural differences between full-timers and part-timers – that might be affecting the benefits and costs of reallocating workers within the firm when facing a negative shock. This will be taken




the quarterly total job-separation rate in steady state is set at 0.1, a standard value in search and



**Table 6: Business Cycle Statistics**

	<b>IPT</b>	<b>FT</b>	<b>PT Ratio</b>	<b>Unempl.</b>	<b>U6</b>	<b>Avg. Wage</b>
	<b>Data</b>					
<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>0.102</b>	<b>0.014</b>	<b>0.115</b>	<b>0.113</b>	<b>0.102</b>	<b>0.007</b>
<b>Relative Std. Dev.</b>	<b>9.204</b>	<b>0.922</b>	<b>9.241</b>	<b>10.168</b>	<b>9.241</b>	<b>0.412</b>

Figure 2: Business Cycle Comovements in the Data and in the Model




As detailed in Section 5, both the firing and reallocation cut-offs are inversely related to aggregate productivity. Less productive matches are destroyed when production is less profitable due to worse aggregate conditions, leading to an increase in the firing threshold. Given the parameterization of  $\alpha$ , which rules the effect of  $A_t$  on the marginal productivity of full-time and part-time

**Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a 1 S.D. Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock**




while the opposite is true when full-time wages are more flexible. These results are in line with the literature that has emerged since [Shimer \(2005\)](#) that has incorporated wage stickiness to search and matching models of the labor market as a way to deliver hig

Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to a 1 S.D. Negative TFP Shock, for different degrees of wage stickiness



**Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to a 1 S.D. Negative TFP Shock, for different exogenous separation rates of part-timers**



and

$$\tilde{z} = \frac{(1 - \eta)}{(1 - \eta)(2\alpha - 1)} \zeta. \quad (29)$$

The elasticities of the firing and reallocation cut-offs with respect to the fringe benefits are

$$\eta_{\tilde{z}, \zeta} = \frac{1}{\tilde{z}} \frac{1 - \rho^P \gamma_v}{(1 - \eta)(1 - \alpha)} \frac{1}{q} \eta_{q, \zeta} + \eta \theta \eta, \quad (30)$$

and

$$\eta_{\tilde{z}, \zeta} = 1, \quad (31)$$

where  $\eta_{\tilde{z}, \zeta}$ ,  $\eta_{\tilde{z}, \zeta}$ ,  $\eta_{q, \zeta}$  and  $\eta$  are the elasticities of the firing and reallocation cut-offs, of the job filling rate, and of the market tightness with respect to  $\zeta$ .

Besides the expected direct effect of higher fringe benefits on the reallocation cut-off, the above expressions also show that fringe benefits may also affect the firing cut-off through their impact on market tightness. Higher fringe benefits are likely to reduce market tightness because it reduces the incentives of firms to post vacancies. This implies that the elasticity in equation (30) is negative: the expansion of healthcare coverage leads to a reduction in the firing cut-off. The opposite happens with the reallocation cut-off, which increases because each full-time match becomes less profitable. As a consequence, the involuntary part-time ratio increases.

The changes in  $\zeta$  considered in this section aim to capture, in a very stylized way, the adoption of regulation such as the Employer Shared Responsibility provisions that are part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). These provisions, which went into effect at the beginning of 2015, require firms with 50 or more employees to provide an affordable health insurance to their full-time workers, or otherwise be subject to penalties that are based both on the number of full-time workers and on the number of months in which an affordable coverage was not offered.<sup>22,23</sup> One of the concerns around the new regulation has been that it would give incentives to firms to reduce their employee's hours below the 30-hour threshold to avoid the costs associated with offering them health insurance. In fact, in a survey carried out in 2014 by ADP Research Institute<sup>24</sup>, 38 percent of the respondents indicated that they would adjust employee hours in response to the Employer Shared Responsibility provisions and, among them, 51 percent were considering the possibility of reducing hours.

<sup>22</sup> In the context of the Affordable Care Act, the Employer Shared Responsibility provisions require firms with 50 or more employees to provide an affordable health insurance to their full-time workers, or otherwise be subject to penalties that are based both on the number of full-time workers and on the number of months in which an affordable coverage was not offered.  
<sup>23</sup> The penalties are based on the number of full-time workers and the number of months in which an affordable coverage was not offered.  
<sup>24</sup> ADP Research Institute, "Survey on the Impact of the Affordable Care Act."

Given the short period of time since the new regulation has been in place, and that its implementation coincides with a period of economic recovery after a major crisis, empirical evidence on the effects of ACA on part-time employment is inconclusive.<sup>25</sup> The results presented in this section shed some light on the effects that such regulation might have on involuntary part-time employment. If all firms in the economy were as the representative firm in my model, in the data we would see an increase in involuntary part-time employment as a consequence of ACA. However, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. In the US economy, 96 percent of firms have less than 50 workers and thus are not affected by the regulation. Therefore, not all firms may have

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of human resources management.<sup>28</sup> This phenomenon was fueled by low IT prices and sustained economic growth, which led businesses to invest in IT equipment and software, as well as by cheaper and increasing electronic connectivity ([Department of Commerce, 2000](#)).

Organizational innovation and the adoption of workforce management technologies make it easier for firms to reallocate workers from full-time to part-time positions by increasing their degree of substitutability. It makes it easier and less costly to allocate workers in shifts, and reduces the difficulties associated to coordinating the availability, preferences and skills of heterogeneous workforces.

In my model, the degree of substitutability between full-time and part-time workers is captured by the parameter  $\varepsilon$  in the production function. To capture the process of organizational innovation occurred since the 1990s, I consider an increase in  $\varepsilon$ . Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to an aggregate productivity shock for different degrees of substitutability between full-time and involuntary part-time workers. When the substitutability is higher then the reallocation from full-time to part-time is easier and more profitable, which leads to a larger increase of the part-time










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# A Figures


Figure 7: Part-time Employment: Economics vs. Non-Economic Reasons



**Figure 9: Transition Probabilities In and Out of Involuntary Part-time Employment**




Figure 10: Involuntary Part-Time Hourly Wages and the Minimum Wage



Source. Own calculations based on data from CPS. Data on minimum wage for each state are from the Department of Labor.

Figure 11: Reallocation and Firing Decisions







## C Firm Optimization

**ADD DERIVATION OF OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS OF THE FIRM**

## D Nash Bargaining

**ADD DERIVATION OF NASH BARGAINING WAGES FOR FULL-TIMERS AND PART-TIMERS**



and

$$w_t^{P,NB} = \frac{\eta^P}{h} (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{n_t} \frac{Y_t^P}{Y_t} \frac{z_t}{\bar{z}_t} + \frac{z_t}{\bar{z}_t} \int_{\bar{z}_t} z f(z) dz + 1 - \rho^P \theta_t g'(v_t) - 1 - \rho^P (1 - \zeta) \int_{\bar{z}_t} z f(z) dz$$

## F Log-logistic Distribution

For the quantitative exercise in this paper I assume that the idiosyncratic productivity is distributed log-logistic with scale parameter  $\alpha$  and shape parameter  $\beta$ . This is equivalent to say that the logarithm of idiosyncratic productivity has a logistic distribution with mean  $\mu = \ln(\alpha z)$  and  $s = 1/z$

