that realism and foreign policy in international relations is aggressively amoral or at least attempts to be so. Could you say a word about how accurate that description is and in what sense you cw - **AGGINE2**(e)r)**G**J-0.0**B**Tc-0.00t2**76**(j0 0 0 scn/GS

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with these kinds of utopianisms, is that it makes the humanly possible work look like nothing at all. The hard work that diplomats do and the hard work that various international organizations do to try to ameliorate conditions, to try to stop the worst stu from happening, that all looks really second rate when measured up against this utopian grandeur.

To the extent that these people have an influence on decision-making, which is the other conduit for utopianism, I think it invites what I warned against already, which is this grandiosity and a kind of moralism. "I embody the moral approach and therefore I can't be wrong. This is the moral approach and everybody who criticizes me is somehow immoral or amoral." So I think you get those kinds of dangers in a utopian approach, whether it's on a level of argument or on the level of policy.

On the level of policy, you're never going to get someone to say this is utopian. However, when you look back and assess it you can see it. We could take for example Woodrow Wilson's plan after the conclusion of World War I. He thought you could divide up the old Austro-Hungarian Empire into perfect little states with national self-determination, where you had a congruence of the border of a state with a type of linguistic community. Theoretically that was supposed to ease the tensions and the conflicts in Europe. Of course, it had quite the opposite e ect because you have these small, relatively vulnerable states where you always have minorities who don't fit in the ideal of what counts as the nation. You just set the stage for many of the conflicts that led up to World War II. When people want to issue a cautionary note, they always go back to that and say, this is what happens when you get a strong moral vision, and you're not taking account of the actual conditions on the ground.

 $_{\rm M}$ = \mathcal{K} : Would you argue that the impulse to democratize the Middle East is a

utopian impulse? Furthermore, how does it relate to this model? **COUT dD [DD BD [B COUT COB CH]T D CB COB CJT CT B CD CD CB** whether to go to war or not. You do not need U.N. approval. You might want it, but you don't require it. And so you set the basis for the policy of your own country.

Many have obviously lamented that and have said that the state form may have emerged, but again it's not inevitable. It could be something that historically has a certain lifespan, and that lifespan has now run its course, and we need to move to some other type of organization. Nobody has figured out what that might look like.

I have to say it's di cult for me to conjure what that might look like too because even something like regional agreements between a number of states still require states to come to agreement. The more you remove from the citizen the source of power under which the citizen laonder whurg.y-**19.19**5.26 l)**92.014** fr me to con

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How solid these connections will be or will remain in a time of crisis is hard to tell. But it's an important development. I'm not sure if it will have the e ect of ameliorating or taming sovereignty over the long run. I think it could in certain settings where you have more regional-

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