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e Editorial Sta of [illegible] would like to extend our sincerest thanks to the following individuals for

worry-free. I extend a heartfelt thanks to our faculty advisor, Fr. Ronald Tacelli, S.J., for his steadfast support and continual encouragement from the journal's inception in 2011 to its current form. We also are greatly indebted to the Boston College Philosophy Department—particularly the e orts of its Chair, Dermot Moran, both for his sagacious advice and his resounding alacrity in agreeing to an interview with our journal—as well as the Institute for the Liberal Arts and its Director Mary Crane, for their nancial and legal support. Department administrators Paula Perry and Sarah Smith deserve a great word of thanks for their help in scheduling meeting spaces for the journal, and also for their essential expertise and unwavering advocacy on the journal's behalf. Lastly, I would like to thank the wonderful e orts of our multi-talented graphic designer Gregory Kacergis, without whom the present work would be impossible; or at least, not nearly the aesthetical masterpiece that it is today (we wish him all the best professionally and cannot express how much his presence will be missed). We also thank here the countless others whose work have made what it is over the years, and you the reader, for your invaluable support and patronage of our journal. We wish you, your families and friends, health and safety as we continue the ght against COVID-19, and look forward to seeing you again in Issue VIII.

All the best and happy reading!

Sincerely,

Noah Valdez, Editor-in-Chief

INTERVIEW WITH DERMOT MORAN

The Joseph Chair in Catholic Philosophy





D . . . . : Could you describe what phenomenology is and say a little about its founder Edmund Husserl?

. . . . **:** Well rst of all, I always emphasize that phenomenology is an approach rather than a strict method. Edmund Husserl, who is the founder of phenomenology and the

much broader interest in concrete human existence. at's really what inspires Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir to take up this notion of existence. , ; 4 literally means existence. So Heidegger is saying phenomenology is an analysis of , ; 4 s being-in-the-world, that becomes translated by the French as a description of our concrete existence. So I would say that you could nd a lot of that in Husserl, especially in the later Husserl. And yet, it's very di cult to tell whether Heidegger's in uencing Husserl or if it's the other way around since both were in daily contact for ten years. Heidegger didn't publish much and Husserl didn't publish much from 1917 to 1927 so we only have their notes, and consequently, it's hard to tell. But both of them start moving more and more to the idea of historically-invented being-in-the-world, which is also limited by time since it is nite—so we are nite beings located in a speci c situation. Right now we are in the middle of the 21st century, so that alters our engagement in the world. So those factors, that being-in-the-world shapes our encounter in the world and means that there's no pure and direct, unmediated experience. Experience is always mediated by our beliefs, customs, habits, practices and so on. at's the big shift I think.

D . 1 1 . : You mention "philosophical bracketing" or the , 4 , ' ; —how might we apply this and other phenomenological tools to everyday or quotidian phenomena?

. 1 . 1 **:** Well, I think Husserl himself picked it up from the ancient skeptics, and he sees it as an archetypal philosophical practiceancien nce. So I wos to evusserl himself picked it up frees i

Clearly we can't just be Luddites, but we also can't blend completely into the security state as Agamben calls it. e long term impact will be this idea of the security state and 'the state of exception' that Agamben discusses. On the other side, we have to be aware of the people that are protesting any kind of a lockdown and gathering with their second amendment rights and their guns to say "nobody's going to tell me what to do" (that's a pretty American phenomenon by the way). But it is an example that comes from a deep-seated suspicion of anything having to do with the state, whether it be anarchist or libertarian in nature. e state is always repressive for these groups, so I think that at the end of the day we have to go somewhere in-between these two

think they cover di erent aspects of the human experience. So I like to see room for both, but of course, as we know, because of the very complicated forms of technical language that have developed in the traditions, there's very little genuine dialogue between them and I've been at it for a long time. In the end, I decided that what's been going on are parallel conversations. So rather than people talking to each other, they're talking about each other in parallel conversations, and that's about as best as we can do.

D **:** Another one of your areas of specialization is medieval philosophy—what initially attracted you to the subject and can you fathom a scenario wherein it would be in dialogue with phenomenology?

: I was really trying to write a dissertation on Heidegger for my PhD in 1976 when he died, and everybody said that there was this massive of collected works coming out, and that it was supposed to be the second part of with all of these manuscripts making current Heidegger research impossible. So now we've had one-hundred volumes of and I'm not really sure it's changed all that much because people still read ! But at the time I wanted to work on Heidegger, and when he died, my supervisor said I shouldn't really work on him. I had a background from my undergraduate days in medieval philosophy, and I knew Heidegger had. So I said I want to work on a Heideggerian theme (the forgetfulness of being in the history of philosophy in the medieval period) and that's what led me to Meister Eckhart. I discovered that one of Eckhart's sources was John Scottus Eriugena, on whom I eventually wrote my PhD. So, in lots of ways, I was kind of emulating Heidegger (who wrote on omas of Erfurt for his Habilitation) and writing about a medieval scholar and trying to answer contemporary questions. Of course, it made me kind of an object of suspicion both by the Heideggerians and the Medievalists, so it was hard for me to keep these two di erent pathways of research open and in dialogue with each other. A lot of the medieval people were philologists and classicists who really didn't want to talk about anything after the Middle Ages, or bring in any ideas from Hegel or Heidegger, or whoever. And similarly, phenomenologists wanted to talk about contemporary issues, and didn't want to talk out the history of philosophy. But it's changing, Jean-Luc Marion is an example of someone who's written on both as well, or Claude Romano who was here this past semester as our Visiting Gadamer Professor.

VIRTUE, SILENCING, AND PERCEPTION[1]

ABHI RUPARELIA

Over the course of several in uential articles, philosopher John McDowell describes the practical reasoning of the virtuous agent using an appeal to his distinctive perceptual abilities.[2] McDowell argues that when such an agent deliberates about a course of action, he never sees any con ict between the demands of virtue and other competing non-virtuous considerations, because for him, the requirements of virtue [illegible] the other competing reasons for action. is conception of "silencing" greatly puzzles modern scholars and has in recent years generated a vast amount of literature on the subject.[3] While the idea itself seems to be aimed at providing an understanding of Aristotle's account of virtue in the [illegible] (hereafter referred to as the [illegible]), McDowell o ers a novel characterization in that he takes virtue to be some sort of superior perceptual capacity. erefore, the aim of this essay is to critically analyze the notion of "silencing" as a condition or requirement for attaining virtue. To achieve this, I begin by brie y laying out Aristotle's description of virtue in the [illegible] Second, I reconstruct McDowell's understanding of virtue and

1 I would like to thank Nancy Schauber, Karin Boxer, Will Reckner, Geo Goddu, Javier Hidalgo, and Jackson LeViness for their helpful comments and insights on earlier versions of this paper.

2 McDowell "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" (1978), "Virtue and Reason" (1979), " e Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics" (1980).

3 Kieran Setiya "Is E ciency a Vice?" (2005), Susan Stark "Virtue and Emotion" (2001), Je rey Seidman "Two Sides of Silencing" (2005), Karen Stohr "Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue" (2003), Anne Margaret Baxley " e Price of Virtue" (2007), Denise Vigani "Virtuous Construal: In Defense of Silencing" (2019), Neil Sinhababu "Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons" (2016), R Jay Wallace "Virtue, Reason, and Principle" (1991), Garrett Cullity " e Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons" (2013), Sarah Broadie "Ethics with Aristotle" (1993), Attila Tanyi "Silencing Desires" (2012), Simon Blackburn "Ruling Passions: A eory of Practical Reasoning" (2001), and Charles Starkey "On the Category of Moral Perception" (2006), among others.

what he takes to be the virtuous agent's decision-making process. ird, I provide two interpretations of this "silencing" ability that have gained popularity in recent literature. Finally, I argue that neither interpretation is satisfactory because they (i) leave gaps in understanding the virtuous agent's decision-making process, and (ii) go against the nature and the description of virtue as laid out in the

A

In Book VII of the Aristotle begins by laying out the four following character types: continence, virtue, incontinence, and vice.[4] Continence and virtue are generally regarded as good and praiseworthy, but the former is less admirable than the latter. Similarly, incontinence and vice are considered to be base and blameworthy, but the former is less so than the latter. For our purposes, we are primarily concerned with virtue and continence.

In the Aristotle distinguishes between the virtues of thought and the virtues of character. He considers the virtue of character to be some type of disposition resulting from habituation. He thinks that such a virtue does not in us naturally; rather, we are, by nature, able to it.[5] He further claims that we, as humans, already possess the capacity to become virtuous; however, in order to actualize this capacity, we need to activate our virtues. He explains this process of "activation" using the example of crafts (in order to become a skilled painter, we need to activate this skill by practicing painting habitually). Similarly, in order to become brave or just, we need to start by performing brave or just actions.[6] In Book II, Aristotle provides us with what appears to be a de nition of virtue:

> Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is de ned by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would de ne it.[7]

is de nition points to two important characteristics about the nature of virtue: 1) For Aristotle, virtue represents a mean between two extremes, one of ex6513 mś(5)Tj7C śBTś0.0

e case of continence is slightly more complicated than virtue. e continent person is similar to the virtuous person in that he always chooses and performs the actions in accordance with rationality and reason. Nonetheless, such a person possesses base appetites and is often tempted by them (and pained by their deprivation), but chooses not to give in. In other words, the continent person is someone who performs virtuous actions, but who nds them di cult, or has to struggle with competing inclinations.[9] In contrast, the virtuous person acts with ease and without a need to overcome competing inclinations.

Furthermore, the continent person stands in opposition to the incontinent person, who, because of the weakness of his will, proceeds to give in to his base desires. Such a person's will is overpowered by his desires, causing him to act against reason.[10]

Again, it is important to remember here that while the continent person acts in the same manner as the virtuous agent, the fact that he allows himself to be tempted by competing considerations suggests that he is, in some sense, morally de cient.

D C

McDowell is primarily concerned with what constitutes a virtuous agent and separates him from the incontinent or the merely continent person. Since these are also the questions that Aristotle mainly concerns himself with in the , McDowell follows in Aristotle's footsteps by beginning with the Socratic thesis that equates virtue with knowledge and uses it as a base to develop a more sophisticated account of virtue. He rst considers the case of the non-virtuous agent as the incontinent person, and then moves on to the non-virtuous agent as the continent person.[11] For McDowell, virtue is a sort of perceptual capacity. He thinks that there is a fundamental di erence between the perceptions of the virtuous agent and the merely continent/incontinent agent. is di erence is primarily what separates the virtuous person from the other two, and largely accounts for his nature.

McDowell's discussion on virtue as a type of knowledge is dependent upon his characterization of the latter as an ability to "get things right."[12] What he means by this is the ability to anticipate the needs/expectations of the situation and to act accordingly, which he calls "reliable sensitivity."[13] He further introduces the concept of "deliverances" of the reliable sensitivity and says that "[deliverances of reliable

9 Ibid, Book VII – 1151a30-115b20.
10 Ibid, Book VII – 1151b21-1152a5.
11 When referring to the "non-virtuous" agent, McDowell appears to be pointing solely at the incontinent and the continent agents. is goes against Aristotle, who takes the continent, the incontinent, and the vicious person to be non-virtuous. Hence, it is not entirely clear, based on his paper, why McDowell does not understand the vicious agent to be non-virtuous. Perhaps one possible explanation might be that he does not consider the vicious person a moral agent at all (which is consistent with Aristotle), and hence ineligible for his discussion on agency and virtue.
12 McDowell "Virtue and Reason," Pg. 331.
13 Ibid, Pg. 331-32.

sensitivity] are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can approximately be described as knowledge."[14] By these lines, McDowell appears to suggest that the virtuous agent subscribes to some version of moral particularism, in that he understands the needs of a situation as dependent upon his perception of it rather than his deductive application of codi able moral

incontinent agent as ,'',,: from the virtuous agent. is "di erence" results from the incontinent person's failure to act virtuously because of the "defectiveness" in his reliable sensitivity (where this defect is a direct outcome of his akratic nature).

Having discussed the case of the non-virtuous incontinent agent, McDowell moves on to the non-virtuous continent agent. He rightly notes that for Aristotle, continence is distinct from virtue, but just as problematic as incontinence. is problematic nature arises because if someone needs to deliberate and to overcome a temptation to act otherwise, in a situation that demands of him that he act according to, say, temperance or courage, then he is simply continent, and not virtuous. On its face, it seems like a trivial di erence; after all, why should the fact that the agent deliberated about a decision (or that he was tempted by a non-virtuous consideration), before going on to choose the right consideration, make him any less virtuous? McDowell claims that this question stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of virtue. at

goes, it can largely be explained in cognitive terms, and deals with an agent's beliefs about action in accordance with reason. Textual support in McDowell for this type of silencing is as follows:

> [T]he relevant [ethical] reasons for acting, on occasions when they co-exist with considerations that on their own would be reasons for acting otherwise, as, not overriding, but silencing those other considerations—as bringing it about that, in the circumstances, they are not reasons at all.[25]

I interpret these lines to mean that when a virtuous person is faced with the choice between di erent moral considerations, there are two possible ways in which he can perceive a situation: a) the non-virtuous considerations are silenced such that they stop being reasons for acting at all; therefore, such non-virtuous considerations stop being (morally speaking, that is) at all and b) the competing non-virtuous considerations are considerations, as far as the agent is concerned; nonetheless, they are so implausible, in that they go against the virtuous nature of the agent, that his will silences them and he never takes such considerations seriously—let alone chooses them.

Under the type-a view of rational silencing, since the competing non-virtuous considerations are silenced, they stop being considerations. As a result, what the agent sees before him are some sort of non-moral considerations that exclude the need for application of normative principles. Hence, they will be irrelevant or meaningless to the agent, at least insofar as the situation at hand requires of him to make a moral judgement.

To understand the latter view of rational silencing, it might be helpful to compare silencing with Gary Watson's distinction between mere desires and the desires that we .[26] Take, for instance, Watson's example of the mother who has a sudden urge to drown her bawling child in the bath. is is a desire that the mother does not . Hence, such a desire is not even taken seriously by the mother. Take, on the other hand, my desire to excel in my classes in order to become a better philosopher. is is an end that I truly and sincerely value. Hence, if we approach the type-b version of rational silencing from the lens of desiring and valuing, it becomes clear that the virtuous agent's will silences the an <</Lang (en-GB)/MwCID 79en-GBthe t9105 Tw5 232

the agent does not actually perform the act of choosing. In making such a claim, I take it for granted that choice, or being able to choose, requires there to be more than one consideration available to the agent. Indeed, the way that choice is intuitively understood, it involves some sort of decision-making on the part of the agent. And for the process of decision-making to work, competing options must exist so as to account for such a process. As a result, if the virtuous agent's perception views only one option as the potential course of action, he does not actually – rather, he the given state of a airs as they manifest before him. Additionally, it is also not as if the agent could from acting, insofar as refraining constitutes a "choice" for the agent, because both Aristotle and McDowell take the perceptual sensitivity of a virtuous person to be motivational. Hence, there can be no situation, barring any physical constraints, where the agent to act on the deliverances of his perceptual sensitivity. us, the agent does not really have a choice other than acting virtuously.

To understand my objection better, consider the following analogy: Imagine that there are four courses of action available to a virtuous person in making a decision. Behind option one, the person sees the action that appears right (virtuous) to him under the particular circumstances; the other three options, however, lead to di erent (non-virtuous) actions, but cannot seem to be chosen by the virtuous person because those three options cease to exist as potential courses of action. Hence, while the person's will can still acknowledge the presence of these non-virtuous paths, so to speak, his will would not them as paths.[31] Consequently, the agent does not even consider them as options because they cannot be acted upon in that particular situation. us, if the agent is successful in choosing the right option in this manner, it would hardly make sense to attribute to him the highest level of praise, that Aristotle and McDowell confer upon him, for his choice. is is because the right option was not by the agent; rather it was taken for granted by him, ae30 0 dt0e(him)gIen-GBattribute to h

agent is the , , of admiration that each receives then, it follows that there is no real di erence between the virtuous and the continent agent as far as praise goes.

A potential counter-argument to my objection stems from the view that it is not the act of , ,, ,, one of the four options that one praises in a virtuous agent; instead, it is the ability of his perception to create a situation where non-virtuous options cease to be options at all. Furthermore, since this ability is achieved through the process of rigorous training, habituation, and transforming oneself from being merely continent to virtuous, it follows that this training is what turns out to be actually praiseworthy. In response, I argue that if we are to praise the agent for his disposition – the hard work he put into becoming virtuous – we are latching on to his past achievements.

ese achievements, while signi cant, are nonetheless irrelevant to the situation in question. Indeed, would it not seem counterintuitive to hold on to the one (and potentially the only) achievement someone has ever had (in this case, training), and to keep on praising them for a lifetime for simply acting in accordance with their training?

Perhaps one may respond here that it does not seem so counterintuitive; after all, we regularly praise Olympic swimmers and chess grandmasters for their training, and regard it perfectly appropriate to do so. But such a response misses its mark because the training involved here is not in the right sense—being able to act morally is not akin to being able to hold one's breath underwater for several minutes. Perhaps my point about the counter-intuitiveness of the scenario can be better understood with an example: if you witnessed our virtuous agent saving a child from drowning, would you rather praise him for his present actions, or for the hundreds of hours he spent in studying Aristotle and learning to become virtuous (not to BTś0 a lis present upbe; (om being mer)1T

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e urgency of this demand emerges from the signi cant overlap between formal and Boolean logic with the implications of the former largely carrying over to the latter. e premises of big data and arti cial intelligence, grounded in Boolean logic, have their linguistics subsumed under natural language processing (and thereby formal logic). is trend persists even as developments in the eld have shifted from rule-based algorithms to statistical models and vector representations. rough its adoption of formal logic's views on inconsistency, the future of technology has then rendered itself vulnerable to these aforementioned harms, and by way of algorithmic learning, will only experience its problems perpetuated and compounded further.

e essay begins in §I with an introduction of epistemic injustice and its associated harms, of which I speci cally focus on illocutionary silencing. With these conceptual resources, §II demonstrates how the assumption of triviality as a consequence of contradiction in icts epistemic injustice in the form of illocutionary silencing. §III continues by o ering a positive solution in the form of paraconsistent logic, and though accounts of this form of logic are wildly disparate—tied only by the common thread of non-explosion—I believe that this one thread is a moral commitment necessary to make.

I. Epistemic Injustice

Introduced by Miranda Fricker (2007), epistemic injustice is an injustice arising from dissimilarities in individual and collective epistemic resources. Fricker then proceeds to divide this into two camps: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.

1. [illegible] "wherein a speaker receives an unfair de cit or credibility from a hearer owing to prejudice on the hearer's part." (Fricker 2007, 9)

Patricia Williams, a professor at Columbia University Law School, demonstrates a paradigmatic case of this in her book [illegible], wherein she recounts a personal, anti-black, racist experience. Yet, upon retelling this event, she would often disbelieve herself—a consequence perhaps in no small part attributable to the prejudicial stereotypes of African Americans as "liars" or "paranoid," consequently leading Fricker to discern that she has su ered an instance of testimonial injustice.

2. [illegible] "wherein someone has a signi cant area of their social experience obscured from understanding owing to prejudicial aws in shared resources for social interpretation." (Fricker 2007, 148)

Sexual harassment is a common example of this second form of epistemic injustice. Prior to its conceptualization, many of those victimized lacked the epistemic resources

to articulate their experiences, which were then previously rendered unintelligible. Instead, their discomfort would be 'interpreted' as overly prudish or lacking in sense

Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, E [illegible]

In a keynote lecture delivered at the 8th Annual Philadelphia Trans-Health Conference in 2009, writer and trans-bi activist Julia Serano stated, "[t]here is simply no more e ective way of hurting me than trans-invalidating me." In what follows, I argue that the consequence of triviality from contradiction clears the path to such harms of invalidation through its enactment of epistemic injustice.

But rst, a brief note on the speci cs of [illegible]. While the path from contradiction to triviality may di er, one such form famously derived by David Lewis takes the following structure:

"Suppose	P and not-P	
en	P	by Simpli cation,
whence	P or Q	by Addition,
	not-P	by Simpli cation again,
and nally	Q	by Disjunctive Syllogism."

According to this argument, any statement follows from the premise of [illegible]. Some may object to this proof in that entailment needs to do more work than simply truth-preservation: it also needs to retain some meaningful connection or relevance between the two propositional statements. Regardless of how one argues [illegible], the central point remains: contradiction explodes into triviality.

It is important to take note of what the de nition and consequences of what it means to be trivial, the rst of which being that triviality could be taken as entailing everything. is, however, draws from the principle of [illegible], proving to be circular reasoning at best, and because of this, cannot be taken freely as the de nition. Second, triviality is that which is uninteresting or insigni cant. Essential to this de nition is the assumed goal of logic and epistemology to uncover truths, or, at the very least, proximate truths about the world. ere are certain propositions more interesting than others and the rejection of contradiction from [illegible] implies the undesirability of triviality. For the remainder of this paper, I adopt this latter de nition.

Having adopted this understanding of triviality as 'that which is uninteresting or insigni cant,' it is now possible to move on to the discussion of inconsistency's intertwinement with epistemic injustice—beginning with an example of gender queerness. Consider the following statement:

(A) I am a girl.

(B) I am not a girl.

Let's say that Alex utters these two statements in response to a question asking them to identify their gender. Alex identi es as genderqueer.[2] To them, both (A) and (B) are true.[3] Given how they identify, Alex is both a girl ,4 not a girl.

By formal logicMCID 1234 >>BDC Ksp sion of

of social injustice stemming from the rendering of the powerless as the speechless. Furthermore, taken as a collective, the experiences of all those who identify as genderqueer are similarly silenced, paving the way for injustice to a ect an entire social class of people like Alex.

Concerning political freedom, Fricker makes this a point in referencing Phillip Petit's contestability criterion. He states that a functioning deliberative democracy needs to meet the three conditions for contestation, which include: a "potential basis for contestation," a "channel or void available by which decisions may be contested," and a "suitable forum in existence for hearing contestations."[4] Being illocutionary silenced, however, disables speakers from contestation. Because Alex's identity was not taken as it was intended in meaning, the immediate jump to the consequence of triviality as stipulated by [illegible] strips Alex of their ability to contest this conclusion. From this, they are excluded from securing a certain threshold of political freedom, which Petit stipulates as necessary for a deliberative democracy.

[illegible]

Returning to my original motivation, the basis of this paper resides in the substantial overlap between formal logic and the logic underlying computer science and arti cial intelligence. It is this overlap and the permeation of technology into nearly every crevice of our lives that lends an urgency to my demand to attempt a recti cation, or at the very least, acknowledgment of the in icted epistemic injustice of [illegible]. In particular, by accepting formal logic as prior to other epistemic sources, as technology so often does, its stance on contradiction—that triviality necessarily follows—then holds the power to dictate our understanding of the world. By taking the principle as an authority on truth, the ontological may end up following the logical. Our social constructions of the world would be determined by a framework strictly adhering to a dichotomous binary, such that it creates a world

identical indicates that they are on the same broad topic of someone being something. Much like the case with many other prepositions and conjunctions, the “not” is not always captured in building the meaning of the proposition.[6]

I take on the assumption that gender identity is something that is self-promulgated rather than externally imposed, well within the right of an individual to proclaim as theirs as it fosters a knowing self-consciousness capable of validating their own experience.[7]

Counter to classical rst-order logic, paraconsistent logic can accommodate the contradiction to uphold the signi cance of Alex's words. For example, the many-valued logics Priest proposed gives space to inconsistent and non-trivial theories. e truth-value of "both true and false" creates a third dimension of truth-evaluation that keeps the relation from exploding into triviality. e consequences of this for Alex are substantial: by not having their words trivialized, their words are therefore legitimized. e admission of inconsistency erases the inherent bias within the traditionally binary logical system that obscures their social experience. is, in turn, de ects the harms of illocutionary silencing and the formal in ictions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.

Still, one might consider another potential interpretation of the apparent paradox posed by Alex's utterances of (A) and (B)—namely, what if this is just a matter of language? e epistemic injustice would not be located in the words themselves, but in linguistic con ation. In the case of Alex, one might argue that their utterances of (A) and (B) re ect a variation in the sense of the term "girl" itself, with one being biological and the other social.

While this may be so, the concern assumes a direct causality where thought is prior

is inherently con ated with the social, which may result in further iterations of the harm (if not also a further narrowing of the hermeneutical resources).

To this, paraconsistent logic may again play the role of a remedy. Admission of (A) and (B) as contradictory, but non-trivial, allows for both the biological and social senses to hold true. e use of adaptive logics, for example, which o ers severance to contact, accounts for internal inconsistency within a single subject. By adapting to di erent situations, the word "girl" takes on di erent meanings according to contextual clues and background knowledge, such as Alex's intentions and the very idea of gender queerness. By this, it allows for both senses to be true, but also admits the term in the same sense with respect to the context of an expanded knowledge of genderqueerness.

I have made the claim that paraconsistent logic o ers a fruitful response to the challenges posed to formal logic by inconsistent, but non-trivial theories and linguistics. But it is possible to take the argument even further: not only does paraconsistent logic do such work, but it also proves necessary in order to properly convey meaning in formalized language. All of this is to say that the logic itself must not dictate meaning, but rather that, meaning must lead to its formalization. e fact that inconsistency permeates our world must be re ected in formalized language. Applications of paraconsistent logic are growing in data and knowledge bases (Grant 2000), isolating inconsistent material so as to simultaneously admit the two nodes of inconsistency. However, interest in such must be acted upon for the purpose of retaining meaning and preventing epistemic injustice.

One last point to be made on my argument: formal logic as it applies to natural language fails , but not necessarily, formally. From the standpoint of logical argumentation, classical rst-order logic does indeed succeed. Furthermore, it must also be noted that it does not in ict epistemic injustice in all cases: when utter (A) and (B), one is necessarily true and the other necessarily false . Classical formal logic succeeds in my case. However, its failure to represent Alex's social experience according to that by which they identity indicates that we not to take it as an omniscient authority over truth.

e argument I have set forth here is not meant to discredit the standing of formal logic in its entirety, but rather, to elucidate its futility under certain contexts. e claim is meant to provide a normative approach to opening the door to logical pluralism. First-order logic need not be discredited in its totality, but its scope be limited in its application and its position ceded to other logical systems (as paraconsistent logic).

SOUND AS SILENCE:

Nothingness in the Music of Anton Webern and John Cage

CHENYU BU

> When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in an eternity before and after, the little space I ll engulfed in the in nite immensity of spaces whereof I know nothing, and which know nothing of me, I am terri ed. e eternal silence of these in nite spaces frightens me.[1]
>
> —Blaise Pascal, [illegible]

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the rise of modern science, the world has no longer been experienced as an 'enchanted garden,' where nature was meaningful and governed by intrinsic value- lled orders. Evoked by this disenchantment with the world, the senses of loneliness and homelessness are well-captured in French philosopher Blaise Pascal's writings, which—centuries later—are escalated further by existential ideology's disenchantment with being. In [illegible], inspired by the question concerning being raised in Martin Heidegger's [illegible], Sartre presents nothingness as the foundation for being and the origin of its nihilation, the non-being. e experience of nothingness makes possible being's encounter with its non-being through the consciousness of freedom. e realization that there is

e notion of the silence of the in nite space invoked by Pascal, however, sheds light

is “symbiosis of opposites”[23] can be simpli ed to the fact that something requires nothingness in order to appear and that nothingness requires something in order to maintain its nothingness. e deduction reveals that silence is neither derived from sound nor self-caused, and it follows that nothingness as the origin of silence must be embodied in sound itself as a potential or possibility of becoming its non-being (. the silence).

4. SILENCE IN WEBERN, FIVE PIECES FOR ORCHESTRA, III AND CAGE, 4’33”

In modernist music repertoires, silence is considered to be state of “a sonic and/or conceptual ideal”[24] to which a work aspires. e purity, complexity and fragmentary in the sonic state of silence becomes a new compositional focus. Drawn by the perishability of sound and the proximity to nothingness that is feared and simultaneously aspired to, in silence, modernist composers aim to achieve such a state through musical languages. Now given that silence as the non-being of sound has its origin and foundation in Sartrean nothingness, in this section, I discuss the approach to silence in contemporary classical music; speci cally, in the third movement of , by Anton Webern[25] and “ by John Cage[26] as a way of evoking an experience of Sartrean nothingness.

In his works, Anton Webern appeals to nothingness not by patches of quietness gapped in rests and pauses as the Classic and the early Romantic composers do, but rather, in relying on musical means to evoke the sense of silence as in the third movement of , (which depicts a mountain vista). With the dynamic marking ,[27] the opening Campanella[28] creates a sense of stillness, which swells with the shimmering sound made by mandolin, guitar, harp, and celesta. Each individual tone in the opening sound’s chromatic cluster[29] is struck repeatedly or rolled on strings, and creates in e ect a sustained, yet vibrating sonority.[30] Since all but one of the tones of the cluster are a semitone apart from each other, the sound creates a seemingly chaotic silence, but accurately conveys the sound of nature and the serenity residing in the mountain. e violin enters later with a slightly louder dynamic playing a fragmented four-note melody, which is then echoed by a muted

23 “Symbiosis of opposites” is a phrase Deborah Weagel uses in the discussion of Cage's notion of silence: Deborah Weagel, and John Cage. "Silence in John Cage and Samuel Beckett: 4' 33" and "Waiting for Godot"." , 12 (2002), 6.

24 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," , vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 333.

25 Anton Webern, “Sehr langsam und ausserst zart”, track 15 on , Ulster Orchestra, Takuo Yuasa, Naxos 8.554841, 2001, compact disc.

26 John Cage, “4’33””, track 14 on . John Cage. Floraleda Sacchi. Amadeus Arte AAP12001, 2012, compact disc.

27 Musical term, meaning “very very softly”.

28 A percussion instrument, meaning “little bell”.

29 Musical term, referring to a chord made of several tones in a pitch class.

30 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," , vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 340.

horn. As the echo fades away, the previous sonority of stillness gradually converges to silence. e rest of the movement is a continuation of the dwindling of soft sonority with the nothingness. Webern creates the sounds that appear to be fragile in the beginning—with their softness and extreme instability due to the semitones—but as they keep vibrating as the only sound in the piece, we hear them struggling to escape from silence before nally give in. In this piece, the silence is heard with sonic density. e musical means used by Webern to capture the quality of silence become interpreted as stillness, softness, hush, and fragmentation.[31] When something elicits nothing, silences itself becomes the act of expression itself.[32] Webern's piece (1913) premiered much earlier than the publication of Sartre's (1943), but it demonstrates at the very least that the once clear distinction between sound and silence had already been blurred well before the French philosopher's investigation of the phenomenon. Retrospectively, Webern's approach to silence through sound could be regarded as a way to evoke the nothingness that Sartre later systematically derives from his notion of being. As a proximity to nothingness, the dwindling soft sonority in the music can easily fall out of our awareness along with silence, but they could always be dissected from silence by its constantly vibrating and changing texture. However, whether it is heard as sound or silence, the nature of the sound itself does not change, since it either possesses or has the potential to possess the de nite ve-determinant relation to the total sound-space. erefore, this particular piece by Webern alludes to the later recognition that nothingness as the origin of silence comes from nowhere else but sound itself.

Silence, as realized in later modernist styles, transcends from an act of expression to an attitude of interrogation. John Cage, for example, was the rst composer who sought the state of pure silence in his works, and his legendary piece « (1952)[33] does not contain even a single note—ushering in four minutes and thirty-three seconds of essential silence as its title indicates. In the text , Cage makes a distinction between the intentional and unintentional sound.[34] For a listener, what we traditionally regard as is the sound heard with a particular relation to the sound-space, while what regarded as we are unaware of (and it consequently recedes into silence). e sound made by the orchestra at a concert according to the notes on music sheets is the intentional making, while the other sounds, for instance, breathing and clothes rustling, are the unintentional. In «, by excluding the instrumental sounds that are normally conceived as intentional, Cage alters the audience's expectation by switching the unintentional sound in the surrounding environment to the intentional—he invites the silence into our auditory

31 Ibid, Pg. 334.
32 Ibid, Pg. 336.
33 e title of this work is the total length in minutes and seconds of the performance. At Woodstock, N.Y., August 29, 1952, the title was 4'33" and the three parts ware 33", 2'40", and 1'20". It was performed by David Tudor, pianist, who indicated the beginnings of parts by closing, the endings by opening, the keyboard lid. However, the work may be performed by any instrumentalist, or combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time.
34 John Cage, , 14.

experience as sounds. Since silence cannot be perceived by itself, the audience are encouraged to listen actively to those sounds that might otherwise be silence for them. Here, standing on the borderland between sound and silence, Cage captures their structural alteration by being conscious of their intimate relationship, thereby demonstrating the relation between being and non-being. Just like the consciousness of being, the consciousness of sound in this piece suspends the presupposed distinction between the intentional and unintentional sound, and in that act, the supposedly unintentional sounds that once were the non-being of sound are now made aware by us and determined by their speci c relation to the sound-space as the new continuum in our auditory experience. Since there is nothing that separates sound from silence, as illustrated in this piece by Cage, nothingness slips into the cleavage introduced by the suspension of consciousness. e notion of nothingness, then, elucidates the (non-)identity of silence with sound: silence is the being of sound, in the mode of not being it.

5. IMPLICATION

What are the implications of the abstract dialectic of nothingness in the world of sound to our auditory experience in daily life? Can the interplay between sound and nothingness go beyond the notion of silence? I would like to o er some preliminary sketches to answer these questions in this nal section.

In the history of western music, silence has never been equal to sound until the rise of modernism in the early twentieth century. e moments of silence in music had been generally considered as "supposed non-sound", which inevitably served as the backdrop against which 'real sound' could be presented and dissected.[35] ose silent moments in music tend to be experienced as expressive quietness; for example, the tense pauses in the opening measure in Haydn's , Op. 76, No. 5 "Finale," or the quiet stillness in Introit of Berlioz's , . Later, as composers gradually shifted away from the conventional musical elements—such as harmony,

of our own auditory experience, music seems to become an arbitrary limitation to how we perceive the sound in the world. Cage describes music as "an organization of sound,"[36] but what is organization? When we contemplate the question, it seems that everything could be an organization; for example, nature, industry, society, and therefore, anything could be heard as music—as Cage writes himself:

> Wherever we are, what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it disturbs us. When we listen to it, we nd it fascinating. e sound of a truck at fty miles per hour. Static between the stations. Rain. We want to capture and control these sounds, to use them not as sound e ects but as musical instruments.[37]

All sounds, including "noise," are music. e notion of noise, however, has not been mentioned or discussed in this paper. It is not normally active in our perception because it is too disturbing to be aware of constantly, so it lacks a de nite relation to the sound-space, (at least for most of us). At the same time, it is not part of relative silence either because we might nd it disturbing even if we are not completely aware of it. us, "[n]oise is the last thing that separates us from silence."[38] Given the analogy between the dialectic of being and nothingness and that of sound and silence, an interesting topic left for future discussion might be centered around the notion of noise (an unescapable element from our normal auditory experience) and how it ts into this essay's conceptual scheme of sound and etwee 9.75 4seng futur6,0hart 9.75 4's

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HUMAN (AND) NATURE:

Using Arendt to Reconcile Models of Environmental Ethics

CAROLINE GILLETTE

INTRODUCTION

In , Hannah Arendt implicitly oscillates between two paradigms that relate the human to nature. ough she neither acknowledges the presence of multiple paradigms nor their apparent contradiction, she alternatively depicts man as part of, and separate from, nature. While these two depictions seem necessarily to con ict, Arendt nds both equally viable and essential to her project. is paper attempts to use the coexistence of these two man-nature paradigms in as a model to reconcile a similar tension between two useful—but equally contradictory—man-nature paradigms in Christian environmental ethics.

value and derives an ethics of environmentalism from them.[2] Peter Cannavò, noting moments where Arendt imbues nature with dignity and meaning, extends her wish for the durability of di erent environments to include the most natural aspects of the human arti ce.[3] Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves identi es similar tension between the role of nature in Arendt's critiques of modernity, though he does not extend the tension to her conception of humans in general.[4] Yet, despite all of these examples and the knowledge of this author, Arendt has never been used speci cally to analyze theological models of environmental protection.

ARENDT'S *NATURE-MAN* PARADIGM

In one paradigm in , Arendt portrays man as inherently part of nature. She calls the earth "the very quintessence of the human condition" and men "the children of nature."[5] e status of man as natural is neither an unhappy accident nor something to overcome, since Arendt bemoans the idea of humans forgetting or leaving nature all together. Her anxiety over modern man's growing alienation from nature frames the b9a51TśEMC ś/Span <</Lang (en-GB)/MCID 2137 >>BDC

view since man can "observ[e] natural phenomena as they were given to him,"[9] but she also concludes that man sees nature rsthand through his senses because he is inextricably in and of it.

e legacy of the Age of Exploration merely compounded these e ects further, since mapping the earth made it seem smaller—literally removed man from it—since much of cartography's poetic propriety takes place in the air.

> " e fact that the decisive shrinkage of the earth was the consequence of the invention of the airplane, that is, of leaving the surface of the earth altogether, is like a symbol for the general phenomenon that any decrease of terrestrial distance can be won only at the price of putting a decisive distance between man and earth, of alienating man from his immediate earthly surroundings."[10]

By mapping the corners of the globe, man set up a dichotomous relationship wherein he was the actor and the earth the acted-upon. Moreover, once he nished, rather than realizing how dwarfed he was by its stature, the earth instead became small to him since by man's own hand he could now see the whole structure at once. It no longer seemed like all-encompassing environment; thereby, leading humans to once again think of the earth from a third-person perspective.

Arendt cites a few examples to demonstrate that this earthly alienation has generally saturated modern humans'—not just scientists' and explorers'—view of their nature, referring to two particular ways in which these "earth-bound creatures … have begun to act as though [they] were dwellers of the universe."[11] First, one can see the results of man no longer believing he is of the earth through what he says about space travel. Humans reacted to the successful launch of Sputnik as if it were the rst step toward a jailbreak, referring to their continued existence on the earth as "imprisonment."[12]

e sentiment that mankind is somehow temporarily "bound to the earth" until it can happily free itself reveals man's entirely new understanding of his place in the universe.[13]

e second piece of evidence that Arendt cites alludes to man's desire to make humans 'not of nature' in the literal sense, referring to the role of bioengineering in order to create life through eugenics, in vitro fertilization and gene editing. Man would not want to do this if he did not already believe that he was not of nature; he is simply making it literal. She speci cally states that the "desire to escape from imprisonment to the earth" shares a motivation with the desire to mix 'frozen germ plasm from people of demonstrated ability under the microscope to produce superior

9 Ibid, Pg. 265.
10 Ibid, Pg. 251.
11 Arendt, , 3.
12 Ibid, Pg. 1.
13 Ibid, Pg. 2.

will refer to this understanding of man's relationship with nature as the [illegible] paradigm.

While subscribing to the [illegible] paradigm, a 'natural man' becomes a contradiction in terms throughout her discussion of labor since Arendt de nes it as the "the most natural and least worldly[17] of man's activities" because it does not lastingly convert nature into anything.[18] Its products are consumed and disposed of, but nature's metabolic process remains unaltered. Meanwhile, a person primarily occupied with labor she terms an [illegible], which means "only one, at best the highest, of the animal species which populate the earth."[19] Putting these facts together, if one is primarily engaged in a natural activity as opposed to worldly activities, one does not even t the de nition of human—one is an animal.

Humans, by contrast, are engaged in work and action, both of which imply some degree of arti ciality. Work "provides an 'arti cial' world of things, distinctly di erent from all-natural surroundings,"[20] as it is the process of converting nature into something durably useful to humans. It is particularly concerned with creating the public realm, which Arendt speci cally says "is not identical with the earth or with nature."[21] It is only in the public realm—not in nature—that action can take place, and only outside nature, then, that man can exist [illegible] man since a life without speech or action "has ceased to be a human life."[22] ś9.i]TJś (en-GB)/MCID 2334 >>BDci ca69r54

in the face of this 'attack,' for it "forever invades the human arti ce, threatening the durability of the world and its tness for human use."[27]

Rather than simply relieve humans of the above-described problems modernity poses in the [illegible] paradigm, while adhering to the [illegible] paradigm,

Pope John Paul II articulates the stewardship model best, as it pertains to environmental protection, in the papal encyclical [illegible]. He a rms man's reign over nature, claiming that man is "superior to the other creatures placed by God under his dominion," but reminds his church that "man must remain subject to the will of God."[31] at is, having dominion over the earth does not mean that humans can do whatever they please. ey must consider the divine will, which, presumably, desires the preservation of nature so that it may continue to bene t the future generations to come. Accordingly, "development cannot consist only in the use, dominion over and indiscriminate possession of created things and the products of human industry" but rather man must remember that he is created in God's likeness.[32] He must have the same concern for what is in his dominion as God has for what is in God's—humankind.

Many have criticized this model because the human obligation to protect the environment is derived from humankind's role as nature's divinely appointed (yet anthropocentric and paternalistic) caretakers, but not due to any special dignity that nature has in and of itself.[33] Even if humans were the perfect stewards—and they certainly are not—some argue that viewing nature as subordinate to and in service of humanity inevitably leads humans to exploit it.[34] ere is no obligation in this model to protect nature in ways that are not eventually useful to man, because nature's value is a consequence of its service to man, leading many environmentalists to prefer a model that views nature as valuable in its own right.

COMPANIONSHIP MODEL AND *NATURAL MAN*

Another theological model that satis es this desire—the companionship model—echoes Arendt's [illegible] paradigm in that it takes man as existing within nature

is argument is strikingly similar to Arendt's. Pope Francis also worries that modern science makes one falsely believe that nature is something one can grasp and act

of humanity remains so because he is engaged in labor—not that he labors at all. As such, homo faber does not cease to be fully human when he stops acting for a moment to eat a meal—he is alive, he sleeps and he does many natural things, but he is still homo faber and is still fully human. Accordingly, man straddles the natural and artificial—he is of nature in some aspects, but separate from it in others. We can simultaneously know by virtue of the fact that we are alive, that we are of nature, and that we have the capacity to create and to act in the world that we are not natural.

Similarly, using tools provided by Arendt, one does not have to choose between the stewardship and companionship models of justification for preserving the environment, but rather, one can understand the relationship between man and nature to be twofold or piecemeal. Man can exist in relationality to, and be of, nature while still being its steward. In believing both to be true, man is forced to find a balance between self-interest and empathy, wherein the drawbacks of each model are balanced out by the presence of the other. More can be done quickly in the realm of environmental protection if humans can be motivated simultaneously by a belief that a healthy environment is beneficial to them and by another belief that all the creatures within nature are humanity's companions.

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(ﻟ ، ﻣﻴ ، ﺩ).[3] If we assess the rest of Heidegger's works in light of this speech, then it is possible to reach a systematic understanding of the relationships that exist between

Despite the alleged ontological complexity of Heidegger's concept of 'earth,' he still can claim that, "[w]e notice that a work of art has owered in the ground of our homeland. As we hold this simple fact in mind, we cannot help [but remember

III. BEYOND ROMANTICISM: THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARTWORK

In the "Question Concerning Technology," after a brief detour through the traditional conception of technology as a means to an end, and a reinterpretation of Aristotle's concept of causality, Heidegger formulates the essence of technology as the , or "enframing". e , marks one of the epochs in Heidegger's depiction of the history of western metaphysics, which just as the Idea was for Plato, is the way in which being announces itself to us in our times. What characterizes our epoch is that the , interpellates us to unconceal the totality of beings as "stock" ( ) in the manner of a provocative order or solicitation ( ).[9] Discerning what exactly Heidegger considers to be the particular characteristics and limits that enable us to distinguish the provocative mode of unconcealment from non-provocative ones represents a tough exegetical challenge. Why exactly does the hydroelectrical dam on the Rhine provoke Nature whereas the temple does not? In this respect, Ihde opposes Heidegger's description of the Greek temple in the "Origin of the Work of Art" to that which J. Donald Hughes o ers in his . While Heidegger o ers a highly romanticized depiction of the temple, Hughes emphasizes the environmental impact that one can see around the Acropolis. Hughes also mentions how even Plato witnessed these concerning ecological transformations when he visited various temples devoted to the guardian spirits of streams, which had already dried out by his time. Nonetheless, these counterexamples su er from two defects. First, the contrast between these examples results from Heidegger's stance that we must understand the work of art in the context of the world that is opened up by it. It is then justi ed to o er a romanticized depiction of the temple since only in this way can we o er an account of its original situation in which the temple properly functions as a work of art. e two examples o ered by Hughes depict works whose worlds have already closed. Second, we must concede to Ihde that Hughes' examples demonstrate how the damage done to nature is not something exclusive to modern technology. However, this does not mean that Greek technology provoked nature in a Heideggerian sense. What concerns Heidegger is the complete hegemony of a certain way of approaching beings that threatens to take over all other possible modes of unconcealment. We must take into account that even if the ancient Greeks could be said to have damaged nature just as much as the English did in the times of Francis Bacon, the di erence between the two of them—and of unique interest to Heidegger—is how from a certain historical horizon nature can be seen as something to be dominated, which is clearly incompatible with the Greek conception of .[10]

9 Martin Heidegger, , (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 17.
10 In more analytical terms, the distinction is not quantitative but qualitative. It does not refer to a measurable

e ultimate danger that the [illegible] represents is that all modes of unconcealment would be redirected to that of provocation. is would signify the end of meditative thinking and the total hegemony of what Heidegger terms the calculative mode of thought. Heidegger claims that the [illegible], which becomes pervasively evident in our times with the advent of such technologies as the nuclear bomb, began operating and developing itself long ago—being the root of modern science's instrumental character and understanding of nature in terms of measurable extension. In this way, Heidegger worries that the only possibility that would remain for man would be "of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering ([illegible]), and of deriving all his standards on this basis. rough this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing."[11] In the language of [illegible], man would fall into an improper mode of existence in which he would no longer understand himself from himself, and, remain oblivious to his own essence as a consequence of understanding both nature and himself in terms of stock ([illegible]). Ihde admits that "Heidegger does not simply outright condemn modern technology—its essence, enframing, is simultaneously a revealing of the world and an openness." In spite of this, Ihde dismisses the danger that Heidegger warms us of by introducing the following question: "In short, all of nature, including the human being, will be seen as reduced to a vast resource well ([illegible]) – but the question then is: for who, or for what end?"[12] However, if we properly understand Heidegger's stance that the [illegible] grounds an epoch of our understanding of beings, then it does not result from any human will or in favor of any human interests. In this respect, Heidegger's stance regarding the hegemony of the [illegible] can be compared to Michel Foucault's description of power relations. Instead of the traditional models of power vested in a source of authority, an individual gure or within a particular group, the microphysics of power do not respond to any such central source; instead, oppressed individuals reproduce within themselves these same structures biopolitically.[13]

e following quote from Heidegger's "[illegible]," thus, takes on the following relevance: "these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision[s]."[14]

Another aspect of Heidegger's romanticism remains in his nationalism as a form of the concept of 'home ground,' which speci cally protrudes in "[illegible]." In relation to art, Heidegger asks "does not the ourishing of any genuine work depend upon its roots in a native soil? […] does man still dwell calmly between heaven and earth? […] is there still a life-giving home-land in whose ground man may stand

11 Martin Heidegger, [illegible] (New York, Harper Perennial, 2013): 26.

rooted, that is, be autochthonic?"[15] ese concepts lend themselves easily to an interpretation that relates Heidegger's thought immediately back to his involvement with Nazism, but this issue is far more complex. e concept of earth is the result of a phenomenology of the work of art and his phenomenology—as is the case for the phenomenology of "equipment" towards the beginning of [illegible], which focuses exclusively on the artisanal mode of production—takes the thematic entity under description from the perspective of a primitive experience. In this way, we can say that Heidegger's phenomenology of art, although seeking to arrive at the essence of art as such, focuses on a model of art in which the production of beautiful objects is not yet distinguished in its particularity from the rest of technological production. In this manner, there seems to be a radical di erence between the Greek temple as studied in the "Origin of the Work of Art" and the example of Van Gogh's painting "A Pair of Shoes" o ered in that very same text. While the essence of the work of art as strife must be descriptive of all forms of art, it seems that the Greek temple is limited to the world of the Greeks, whereas Van Gogh's painting properly reveals to Heidegger the essence of art as such. Iain omson claims that "in Van Gogh's painting—the strange space which surrounds these shoes like an underlying and yet also enveloping atmosphere—one can notice that inchoate forms begin to emerge from the background but never quite take a rm shape; in fact, these shapes tend to disappear when one tries to pin them down."[16] In this manner, Van Gogh's painting can be said to re ect the structure of the type of strife that Heidegger deems the essence of the work of art.

Meyer Schapiro famously objected to Heidegger's interpretation of Van Gogh's painting as nothing but a subjective projection of his own romantic preferences, since the shoes that the painting depicted were Van Gogh's own—those of a city man, and not, as he states, those of a countrywoman. Most Heideggerians would claim that Schapiro misses the important aspects of Heidegger's example; namely, the ontological depth sought in the phenomenological description of the work. While I partially agree with this rebuke, the fact that Van Gogh painted his own shoes[17] acquires utmost importance precisely because it means that we are facing an ontological work that re ects on its own being—a transcendental art

the conditions of its own possibility. is kind of art di ers altogether from what one could deem pre-transcendental art, such as the Greek temple, or any other work of art previous to Cervantes' revolution in putting forth his highly re ective Don Quixote—comparable to that started in philosophy twenty years later by Descartes in his .[19] We can say, without departing too much from Heidegger, that a work of pre-transcendental art is a sensible manifestation of the spirit of a community or, in less Hegelian terms, that it consolidates its ethno-political identity by providing a tangible foundation for its political organization. Nonetheless, we can only claim that this is art's function because of Heidegger's radical claim that the temple founds the Greek world in the sense of a cosmovision, opening the historical horizon of intelligibility for their understanding of beings. As Heidegger says, "Standing there, the temple rst gives to things their look, and to men their outlook on themselves."[20] While the temple's essence is the strife in which the earth is brought to the clearing of human intelligibility, Van Gogh's painting re ects the strife itself, as his broad brushstrokes abandon the de ned lines of realism and evoke the elusive and receding aspect of the earth. In this way, we can appreciate the link between Heidegger's aesthetics and nationalism, since as long as an explicit distinction between transcendental and pre-transcendental art does not arise, the concept of 'earth' remains tied to that of a 'home ground' and autochthony. Heidegger's " " functions as an exhortation for thinking about a new autochthony that would allow us to dwell properly in the midst of the irreversible changes brought through modern technology.

Releasement ( ) is the attitude that Heidegger proposes as that which we need to assume in order to face the threats of modern technology. In " e Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations," Ihde states that "there is a 'technosphere' within which we do a good deal of our living, surrounding us in part the way technological artifacts do literally for astronauts and deep sea investigators."[21] Despite his romanticism, Heidegger similarly observes that, "[f]or all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices."[22] Given that we depend on the world of technology or the technosphere, releasement means saying "yes" to modern technology, remembering, however, that

exception of those who subscribe to literary realism). Furthermore, an interesting dialogue can be opened with Danto's philosophy of art since his periodization of the history of art responds to the degree of self-consciousness evidenced by artists. Danto distinguishes between pre-art and Art, the latter corresponding to the epoch in which artists as the makers of beautiful objects are distinguished from artisans. e infamous claim of the end of art precisely refers to the epoch in history, the 20th century, where art itself becomes philosophical as it explicitly poses the question, "What is art?"

19 We could also mention here another exponent of the Spanish renaissance: the painter Velazquez, known for his self-portrait Las Meninas and his extensive depiction of mirrors.

20 Martin Heidegger, , (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21.

21 Ihde, D., , (Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979), 14.

22 Martin Heidegger, , (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 53.

the essence of modern technology insofar as it compels us to understand nature merely as a quantitatively measurable reserve of resources (including what we deem the “human resources”) threatens to redirect all modes of unconcealment to that of provocation. Since this would signify a fall into an improper mode of existence as we stop re ecting upon ourselves to understand humanity merely in terms of stock, releasement simultaneously has to say “no” to the pervasiveness of the

from Earth-as-ground. But they are also irreversibly part of the postmodern view of Earth-as-globe, with a very di erent sense of what constitutes our 'home'."[26] As this essay demonstrated, Heidegger recognizes this irreversible aspect of the profound changes in humanity's relation to nature and the world and exhorts us to [illegible] so that we can build a "home" in the technical world. In this regard, Heidegger's thought is closer than ever to the spirit of Kant's philosophy: not only does he o er a critique of the illegitimate claims of the science of his time that threaten to warp and destroy human freedom, but he also calls upon us to understand our dwelling within the world in cosmopolitan terms.

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