The Economic Consequences of Family Policies:

Lessons from a Century of Legislation in High-Income Countries

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Abstract

We draw lessons from existing work and our own analysis on the effects of parental leave and other interventions aimed at aiding families. The outcomes of interest are female employment, gender gaps in earnings and fertility. We begin with a discussion of the historical introduction of family policies ever since the end of the nineteenth century and then turn to the details regarding family policies currently in effect across high-income nations. We sketch a framework concerning the effects of family policy to motivate our country- and micro-level evidence on the impact of family policies on gender outcomes. Most estimates of the impact of parental leave entitlement on female labor market outcomes range from negligible to weakly positive. The verdict is far more positive for the beneficial impact of spending on early education and childcare.

Keywords: parental leave, childcare, family policies, gender gaps.

JEL: J13; J16; J18.

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Among the most remarkable changes in the labarkets of high-income nations during the past century have been the rise in the female workforce and the narrowing of gender gaps in schooling and earnings. At the same time, government mandates and firm policies regarding families expanded. In sometainses, legislation was preceded by great economic change, as when the spread of industrialization in the nineteenth century led to calls for restrictions on female work. Other legislation resulted from social and political change, as occurred during the womenÕs movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Demographic change also played a role as nations have sought to address declining fertility or when dictatorships desired to increase population. By the early twiestycentury, most high-income countries have put

within-country variation in intervention, exploiting internationally consistent data on a variety of labor market outcomes. The proach has the advantage of considering an array of policy interventions and interdependencies among them, as well as gequilibrium effects of the policies. But such measurement is invariably coarse and the identification of the causal impacts of interest can be problematic. Since we have some estimates based on country level data, we will need to emphasize these limitations throughout our discussion.

The micro-level approach evaluates the causal impact of specific policies within a country by combining rich micro data with variation from natural experiments, such as the lengthening of leave policy or the provision partial leave. The approach generally considers just one policy intervention at a time, but detailed characterization of the institutional environment allows for more meaningful comparisons.

We draw lessons here from existing work and our own analysis on the effects of parental leave and other interventions aimed at aiding families. The outcomes of interest are female employment, gender gaps in earnings and fertility. We begin with a discussion of the historical introduction of family policies ever since thred of the nineteenth century and then turn to the details regarding family policies currently in effect across-in-ignime nations. We sketch a framework concerning the effects of family policy to motivate our country micro-level evidence on the inapt of family policies on gender outcomes. Do7rk 4r o1to tj [(leve

leave, followed by France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain Greece in the early 20th century!

The emphasis in early legislation was mostly about protecting physically weaker workers from extreme working conditions, and concerns for the health of mothers and children typically led to bans on female employment within a few weeks of birth. Mandated leave was only sporadically accompanied by job protection or income support. Unions often latched ontoon such special provisions for womienorderto lobby for a shorter workweek for men (Goldin 1988). In 1919, the International Labor Organization advocated maternal rights to 12 weeks' leave from work around the time of birth, combined with job protection and partial income support. While maternal leave was ratified in most member countries, job and income protections did not become the norm until muchilate 20th century.

In the 1950s, the design of family policies across Europe emphasized traditional gender roles, and explicitly protected women in their capacitives and mothers. During World War II, women in countries with high rate of male mobilization had filled jobs in male-dominated sectors like manufacturing, transportation, and military industry industry

The late 1960s and 1970s brought important changes in maternity leave provisions and set the basis for wider selection of modern family policies. The sharp rise in female labor market participatiogenerated greatelemands or maternity leave provisions as a way to reconcile careers and motherhood untries that haddopted maternity leave earlier often extended these provisions substantially, while other countries Citimeda and Australia introduced such provisions Most high-income countries combined leave periods with job protection and increased income support during loyment breaks weden was the first country to introduce explicit paternity leave rights in 1974, allowing mother and father to share six months of parental leave ther European countries started to supplement Omaternity leave available to mothers around the time of childbirth, with Oparental, we available to both parents uring a child os early yea (as reported in the DECD Family

[&]!See Wilkander, Kesslerlarris and Lewis (1995).

^{*}In Appendix Table A1, available online with this paper at http:j/ep.org,we report a summary of early legislation based on a comparative study published by the US Departnic about Children Os Bureau (Harris 1919).

Database OPF 2.5 Annex: detail of change in parental leave by countingsé)changes, together with the decline in the manufacturing sector and the weakening of trade unions, contributed to eroding the male breadwinner model in mostihighme countries.

The United States

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Family Policies in OECD Countries

At present, allhigh-income industrialized countries have in place paid maternity leave rights (with the exception of the United States where this is unpaid) provide some support, in cash okind, for child care. Table 1 provides a snapshot some keyfamily policies in a recent cross-section of developed economies cluding the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and 11 large European count Hilbsindicators reported are obtained from the OECDFamily Database and Social Expenditure databased refer to the latest available year, between 2011 and 20315.

Countries are organized idecreasingorder of duration of job-protected leave provisions for mothers, which reported in column 1. This includes maternity leave and the maximum job-protected parental leave available to mothers home care of children, whether or not income support is also included simplicity we will refer to this variable as Oparental leave. Of The mediamentalleave is about 60 weeks with very wide variation across countries, summarised by a standard deviation of almost exactly or eyerseny, France, Spain and Finlandhave leave entitlements above three years, followed by and Swedenwith around 20 months entitlement. At the other extremethe United States has 12 weeks of parental leave While this figure refers to federal entitlements are currently 25 states that have expandined some way or another pon federallegislation. Interestingly, cross-country variation in parental leave rights is much wider than in other labor market institutions such as the unemployment benefit replacement ratio and the tax wedge D and, as we will discuss later, wider than in gender employment outcomes.

Variation in maternity leave provisions around the tipefechildbirth, shown in column 2, is modest in comparison, withmost countries ranging between 14 and 22 weeks. As shown in column 3on average about one-third of this ime must be taken before birth. The bansthat some countries have on working late pregnancy are likely a vesting of the countries have on working late pregnancy are likely a vesting of the countries have on working late pregnancy are likely a vesting of the countries have on working late pregnancy are likely a vesting of the countries have on working late pregnancy are likely a vesting of the countries have on working and the countries have on working and the countries have on working the countries have on working the countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have a countries have on working the countries have a countries hav

³ TableA2, available online with this paper at http://ep.org 041 Te2 0 Td s

early legislation, from a time whean larger share of jobs, like marryanufacturing jobs of the past, were physically strenuous.

In all countries except the United Statessubstantial portion of parental leave is paid as shown in column 4Leave benefits are usually funded (by combination of)

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To give an example, women in Denmark and Italy have very similar entitlement to parental leave around 50 weeks, with nearly identical replacement ratios. However, maternity leave extensions in Italy happened mostly before the 1960s, with long mandatempeabs periods before and after birth, especially in manufacturing and agriculture, and no provisions for fathers. In Denmark, the bulk of parental leave legislation came into play after 1960, during decades of rapidly evolving social norms, and with limitable stitutability between maternal and paternal leave rights. Comparable maternal leave rights are currently coexisting with relatively gender-biased norms in Itally where, according to the uropean Value Survey, 70% of the population agree or strongly agree with the statement OPre-school children suffer from a working mother O, but with much more gender-neutral attitudes in Denmark Dwhere only 10% of the population do so. In factors-country evidence does not reveal any clear-cut association between the generosity of parental leave and answers to gender-related survey questions between the generosity of parental leave and answers to gender-related survey questions between the senerosity of parental leave and answers to gender-related survey questions between the senerosity of parental leave and answers to gender-related survey questions to spend less on early childhood edurations, and are less likely to accommodate flexible working arrangements.

Framework

Most family policies are intended to encourage female labor supplyor Fexample, subsidized childcare seeks provide direct substitutes for maternal childcare. Maternity leave seeks to enable mothers to stay attached to the labor market during temporary interruptions of employment while retaining firm-specificor occupation-specific human capital. Similar arguments can be made for flexible or part-time work arrangements. However, extended maternity leave may have detrimental effects on female labor stupply the long-runif it induces women to stay out of work for long enough repeated periods in a way that hinders them from re-entering employment on the same pre-maternity track.

Besidesthesefirst-order impactson labor supply, family policies may feed into labor demand decisions via at least two chann@lss.the one handinsofar as part of the costs of these arrangements directly or indirectly trickdewn on employers, the demand female labor (and especially for women of childearing age)would benegatively affected. On the

⁶ In Table A3

other side if family policies effectively ease continuity of employment for mothers, and their enhanced labor market attachment is incorporated into employeeliefs the extent of statistical discrimination (if any) against women would be reduced, with beneficial effects on labor demand for women.

In a competitive labor market with imperfect substitution inputs, the change in the gender wage ration are sult of family policies is theoretical hymbiguous, depending on the relative shifts in labor supply and labor demand and the context in which such shifts occur. For example, if equal pay legislation effectively prevents a fall in female with general cities that would raise the cost of hiring women may lead that in female employment at constant wages. Similar effects are to be expected in the presence of union contracts or

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alongthese and other dimension wage effects may be mitigated or even reversed whenever continuous labor market attachmentlabor market experience is highly valuable in the presence of search frictions, high returns to actual labor market experience and feedback mechanisms onto employers beliefs. the other hand, theories of gender statistical discrimination suggest that these policies might backfire by reinformemployers beliefs and social norms regarding women social social norms regarding women social advantage in childcare and home production more generally.

Cross-Country Evidence

Given wide international variation in family policies, several papers have compared institutions and gender labor market outcomes admigsts-income

parental leave rights and lead simultaneously to both extended rights and higher female employment rates.

The general approach Ruhm (1998) has been extended by later work to cover more recent years, a wider set of countries, and a richer sienstitutions. ThŽvenorand Solaz (2012) broadly confirm Ruhmõs findings carcross-section of countries observed between 1970 and 2010. Using dataon a sample of 1 high-incomeOECD countries or 1990-2010, Blau and Kahn (2013) find that gender gaps in both employment and wages shrink with parental leave rights, the generosity of benefits, the right of tipaert work, and equal treatment legislation (although on the effects of the latter two are statistically conficient). The authors conclude that the expansion of the latter two are statistically conficient.

The authors conclude that the expansion of the employment growth in the United States the early 1990s relative to other OECD countries. Cipollor exatachini, and Vallanti (2014) find evidence of heterogeneous policy effects by showing that female participation of medium-and highly-educated women is more responsive to family subsidies and elderly subsidies D than participation of less-educated women.

A few papers have exploited staggered introduction of parental leave rights across geographies within a country. Bau(2003) focuses on the partial state-lead bption of leave rights in the United Stateshead of the Family and Medical Leave Airt 1993, and fails to detect any significant impact of leave rights comployment or wages of mothers. Using a similar approach an et al. (2009) detect detrimental employment effects of parental leave and welfare benefits, and positive effects of childcare spending, for single mothers and the less-skilled. Baker and Milligan (2008) finds that the introduction of leave rights in Canadian provinces delays return to workmothers shortly after birth, but eases returns to the pre-birth employer.

Below we complement existing cross-country evidence by bringing together data on 30 countries that are currently in the OECDFigure 1 summarizes evidence on female employment inthesecountries since the 1970s (or the 1980s where serilier data are not available). The employment rate is measured that number of individuals aged 25-54 who are employed, divided by the relevant populat countries are ranked in ascending order of female employment in the 2010s, ranging from 28% in Turke 79% in Iceland. The average employment rate in the sample is currently 60%, with a standard deviation of 10%. The US female employment rate of 62% us jabove the sample average. Scandinavian countries rank towards the top of the chart, followed by most English-speaking countries,

while southern European countries and lower income countries rank towards the **bro**ttom. relative terms, there is much wider variation in parental leave rights across these countries

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correlation with the fertility rate. None of the policy variables e significantly correlated with the gender earnings g^Zap.

When we differentiate relevant outcomes across three skill groups N below secondary education, secondary education are femalæarningshigher in countries with flexible working arrangement the other hand, correlations with employment outcomes are consistent across the skill distribution.

We next look at the impact of family policies on gender outcomes expelcibleir evolution over time, and controlling for country and year fixetelects D while bearing in

from our working sample countries without available information on the replacement ratio, which happen to have systematically lower rates of union density than the rest of the countries. In other words, the results of columbrare obtained on a sample of countries with a lower average incidence of binding union contracts than those of column 5, and thus provide evidence of a more sizeable wage response to policy in a context in which wages are relatively more flexible. Overall, coefficients on parental ave denote a stronger effect on earnings gaps in column 6 than on employment gaps in column 4, which implies that wage gaps are also closing for a wide range of parental leave durations.

Column 6 also shows evidenceæfelatively strong effect of early years spending on closing earnings gaps, which larger than the corresponding effect on employment gaps in column 4. By the same logic, this implies that wage gaps are predicted to shrink with childhood spending.

In columns 7 and 8we show thathe effect of parentalleave on fertility is also non-monotonic, but quantitatively this negligible throughout independent of the specification used, consistent with ShimÕs (2014) finding that fertility decisions not much responsive parental leave is also adequately paid arrly childhood spending has sizeable correlation with raising fertility, with one extra percentage point of GDP spendistopiated with 0.2 extra children pervoman. The results reported in column 9 are overall consistent with Adema, Ali and ThŽvenonÕs (2014) findings that public spending on family benefits and the duration of paid child-related leave for mothers is significantly associated with an increase in the total fertility rate.

In Table 4,we consider heterogeneous policy effentsæducational attainment.he sample sal 1ae0 Td [-1.72 Td n(educatr)]TJ in tilo8.5e

resulting insignificant reductions infemale employment and earnings during the first three yearsafter birth, but only minor effects beyond three years. While fertility effects are stronger for women with below-median pre-birth earnings, the short-eduction inearnings larger for high-wagethan low-wage women. Later Austrian reforms of 1996 and 2000 shortened and extended, respectively, entitlement to replacement benefits, leaving textendeave unchanged, and alive et al. (2013) estimate that longer cash benefits significantly dela return to work of mothers when leave is job-protected, but less so once job protection has expired.

Germany enacteritive major expansions in maternity leave coverage between 1979 and 1993, whiched to gradual and staggered extensions inpiratected leave from 2 to 36 months, and in the time of receipt focash benefits from 2 to 24 months choenberg and Ludsteck (2014) find that extension of coverage at short durations leads to small delays in return to work, and extension at long durations lead barger delays, but it has almost no effect on employmentrates and earning for women more than three earsafter childbirth. However, extensions of cash benefits beyond the job protection period corresponding long-run employment and earnings losses for affected mothers, suggests sole for job guarantees in avoiding long-lasting negative effects of benefit extensions.

Norway enacted series of seven expansions in paid maternity leavechwhearly doubled from 18 weeks in 1977 to 35 weeks in 1992ahl et al. (2016)

Schmitz, 2014) Raute (2015) investigate ertility effects of the 2007 German reformand finds sizeable fertility gains for women with above-median earnings and older whomen.

While most high-income countries currently have in place leave provisions for fathers, their relatively recent introduction, as well as their more limited upake te, imply that the evaluation of heir effects on female outcome is still in its infan@vailable

The Canadian province of QuŽbietroduced child-care subsidies for four year-olds in 1997, combined with wider availability and high quality of servlices ebvre and Merrigan (2008) find a sizeable impact of this scheme on mater229.2(on)1fon this f(of 2 0 4.888nd)T

disincentiveeffects on the participation rate of marriedmen, consistent with the fact that the EITC raises average taxation on the secondary earner's earlieitzgand Scholz (2003), Nichols and Rothstein (2016), and references in tpasers offer detailed discussion of the effects of the EITC on work, poverty, health and family outcomes.

recent estimates find positive effects up to 1 year and negative effects adsentwat widespread extensions to leave rights in most countries ihevitably shifted the focus of later studies based on micro data towards variations in parental leave at much longer durations, up to three yearshus, it might be possible that the availability of some job protection, relative to no protection at all, would ensure continuity of employment and discourage transitions out of the labor market, while further extensions would simply delay return to work without further gains in employmenthic, cross country studies often

The United Statebasbeenan outlierin the adoption of amily policies acrosshigh-income countries since the turn of the entieth century As Goldin and Mitchell argue in this symposium, the female labor force participation in the US has evolved in the term with very highrates of employmentarly in the life cycle, but harply declining with motherhood, which is being progressively delayed he cross-country and micro-level evidence has not found an overall strong connection between maternity leave and female labor force participation. But possibly the relatively short leave entitlements available to mothers in the United States contributes to this life cycle pattern of delaying herhood with persistently low rates of participation while women are in their 30s and 40s

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Appendix: Variable definitions

1. Institutions

Maximum job-protected leave available to mothers, regardless of income (weeks)the maximum number of weeks of employment protected parental leave available to mothers, regardless of income support his is the sum of weeks of maternity leave, parental leave and homencare. countries where the entitlement to parental leave lasts up until the point at which the aches a certain age (as is the case in Germany, for example, where one paretitied to leave until the child sthird birthday), any weeks of maternita whethat can be

- ! !_{!"#\$"%&} : The "average payment rate" refeothe proportion of previous earnings replaced by the benefit over the length of the paid leave entitlement for a person earning 100% of average national (2014) earnings. If this covers more than one period of leave at two different payment rates then a weighted average is calculated based on the length of each period. In most countries

2. Outcomes

Employment to population ratio by gender is from the OECD Labor databas The employment rate refers to the number of peoplem ployed divided by the relevant population the employed are defined as those who work for pay or profit for at least one hour a week, or who have a job but are temporarily not at work due to illness, leave or industrial action are for men and womanged 25-54 and are available for the period 1927014.

http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R

Employment to population by gender and educational attainments obtained from the OECD Employment databasehis indicator shows the employment databasehis indicator shows the employment pulation ratios beducation grouped in three caegories below upper secondary, upper secondary treotiary, or tertiary. The employment rate is computed as percentage of the population 2564

ac 18.44 0 9.998




Figure 1: Evolution of Female Employment Rates: 1970s to 2010s

Notes: The figure reports average employment rates for women aged 25–54, by decade. The employed are defined as those who work for pay or profit for at least one hour a week, or who have a job but are temporarily not at work due to illness, leave or industrial action. We report female employment since the 1970s or the earliest available decade.

Sources: OECD Employment Database,

http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R, 2016.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
country	Maximum job- protected leave for mothers (weeks)	Total maternity leave (weeks)	Pre-birth leave (% maternity leave)	Total paid leave available to mothers (weeks)	Average Payment Rate for Mothers (% of average, 2014, national earnings)	Total paid leave available to father (% total paid leave for both parents)	Early childhood education and care (%GDP)	Accumulate days off /vary start/end of daily work (% companies)
Spain	166	16	63	16	100	12	0.6	34.07
France	162	16	38	42 / 110	44.7	40 / 33	1.2	54.29
Germany	162	14	43	58	73.4	13	0.5	62.00
Finland	161.03	17.5	29	161.03	26.5	5	1.1	86.05
Norway	91	13	23	91	50.0	10	1.2	
Sweden	85	15.6	45	60	63.4	14	1.6	74.18
United Kingdom	70	52	21	39	31.3	5	1.1	46.83
Greece	60.33	43	19		0	31 0 Td (19)aSe2c2(19)aSe2c2(1	9) 50.4m 50.0

Employment Earnings

Maximum weeks of job-protected leave available to mothers 0.188 -0.385

Table 3: Family friendly policies and women's outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Female emp	loyment rate	Employ	ment gap	Earni	ngs gap	Fertil	ity rate
Maximum weeks of job-protected leave	0.113***	0.063**	-0.050***	0.023	-0.011	-0.210***	0.002	-0.001
Maximum weeks squared/100	(0.019) -0.078***	(0.029) -0.062***	(0.018) 0.043***	(0.022) 0.012	(0.033) 0.016	(0.033) 0.108***	(0.001) 0.001	(0.001) 0.001**
Percentage of total leave that is paid	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011) 0.029***	(0.016)	(0.016) 0.006	(0.001)	(0.001) 0.002***
Average payment rate		(0.008) -0.036***		(0.006) 0.027***		(0.008) 0.012		(0.000)
Early childhood education and care		(0.011) 3.613***		(0.008) -1.587***		(0.019) -2.852**		(0.000) 0.270***
Constant	43.955***	(0.903) 47.007***	41.954***	(0.564) 37.892***	44.709***	(1.258) 52.367***	2.810***	(0.024) 1.753***
	(1.561)	(2.016)	(1.913)	(2.497)	(0.936)	(1.144)	(0.117)	(0.057)
R-squared	0.914	0.921	0.931	0.944	0.943	0.967	0.718	0.692
Mean of dependent variable	54.8	55.1	20.6	21.0	23.4	23.7	1.9	1.7
Observations	1,026	667	1,026	667	545	340	1,325	806
Time period	1970-2014	1970-2010	1970-2014	1970-2010	1970-2013	1970-2010	1970-2014	1970-2010
Number of countries	30	22	30	22	30	22	30	22

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include country and year effects. The average payment rate is from the Max Planck Institute's Comparative Family Policy Database (Gauthier, 2011). It's computed as a weighted average of payment rates for maternity leave, parental leave and childcare leave with weights given by the length of each leave type. The cash benefits are expressed as a percentage of the average female wage in manufacturing. See notes to Table 1 and 3 for all other variables definitions and sources. Percentage of total leave that is paid is the ratio of total paid leave available to mothers to maximum weeks of job-protected weeks (paid/unpaid) available to mothers.

(1) (2) (3) (1) (3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
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	Female employment rate	Earnings Gap	Female employment rate	Earnings Gap	Female employment rate	Earnings Gap
Maximum weeks of job-protected leave	0.164**	-0.112	0.097	0.062	-0.011	0.232**
Maximum weeks squared/100	(0.083) -0.171*** (0.059)	(0.152) -0.257** (0.130)	(0.060) -0.097* (0.054)	(0.114) -0.122 (0.081)	(0.046) -0.054* (0.030)	(0.107) -0.138* (0.078)
Constant	47.872*** (3.274)	62.487*** (5.852)	63.132*** (2.013)	50.854***	79.560*** (1.736)	39.626*** (4.955)
R-squared	0.946	0.840	0.956	0.883	0.921	0.758
Mean of Dependent Variable	46.6	44.3	65.7	40.0	78.7	42.6
Observations Time period	492 1997-2013	300 1997-2013	504 1997-2013	300 1997-2013	504 1997-2013	300 1997-2013

Table A1: Pre-1969 trends in maternity leave legislation

Country	C 4 \$7		ave (weeks)	Manda	ted (Y/N)	Job-Protection	Paid	Course of novement
Country	Year	Post-birth	Total	Pre-birth	Post-birth	(Y/N)	(Y/N; %)	Source of payment
					Panel A: 1870	- 1940		
Austria	1985	4			Y			
	1988	4			Y	Y	Y	
	1917	6			Y	Y	Y; 60%	Employer (1/3); insured person (2/3)
Belgium	1889		4		N			
Denmark	1892		1.1		N		Y	Voluntary sickness societies subsidized by the State
	1901	4			Y		•	
	1915	1.4			Y		Y	National Government
	1933		2		Y		Y	National Government
Finland	1917	4					•	
	1919	6			•	•	•	
	1922	6			•	Y	•	
	1937	6				Y	Y	Maternity allowance
France	1909	•	8		•	Y	N	
								Mutual aid societies (subsidized by the national or local
	1913	4	8	•	Y	Y	Y	Government); Ministry of Education for teachers maternity leave.
Germany	1878	3			Y	N		
,	1900	6			Y	N	Y	
	1908	6	8	Y	Y	N	Y	Employer (1/3); insured person (2/3); persons who insure voluntarily must pay the entire cost of their insurance.
	1924	6	14	Y	Y	Y	Y	voluntarily must pay the entire cost of their insurance.
Greece	1910		•	Y			N	
	1921	6	12	N	Y	Y	Y	Public funds or insurance
Italy	1902	4			Y		N	
	1910	4		•	Y	Y	Y	Employee and owner of establishment pay half and half;
	1934	6	10	Y	Y	Y	Y	the National Government also adds support
Mexico	1917	4	4	N	Y		Y; 100%	•
Netherlands	1889		4	Y				
	1913						Y; 100%	Compulsory sickness insurance: one-half paid by the employer and one-half by the insured person
	1919	8	10	Y	Y		•	

Country	Year					Job-Protection	Paid	Source of payment
		Post-birth	Total	Pre-birth	Post-birth	(Y/N)	(Y/N; %)	
Norway	1892	6			Y (4 weeks)	•	N	
	1909	6			Y	Y	Y;60%	Compulsory sickness insurance paid by: (1) The insured, 60%; (2) the employer, 10%; (3) the local government, 10%; (4) the National Government, 20%.
	1915	6	10	N	Y	Y	Y	Add voluntarily insurance paid by: (1) The insured, 70%; (2) the local government, 10%; (3) the National Government, 20%.
Poland	1924	10	12	N			Y; 100%	
Spain	1900	•	•			Y		
	1907	6			Y	Y		
Sweden	1891	4			Y		N	
	1937	6	12	Y	Y	Y	N	
Switzerland	1877	>=6	8	N	Y		N	
	1914	6			N	Y	Y	Dues of the members and the subsidy of the Federal Government
	1920	6	8	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Country	Year	ar Maternity Leave (weeks) Mandated (Y/N) Job-Protection		Paid	Source of payment			
		Post-birth	Total	Pre-birth	Post-birth	(Y/N)	(Y/N; %)	
France	1946	4	14		Y	Y	Y	Mutual aid societies (National or local Government); Teacher's maternity leave annual budget of the ministry of education
Germany	1968	8	14	Y	Y	Y	Y	Social security system and employers
Ireland	1952		12		•		Y	Maternity allowance
	1968		12				Y	Compulsory insurance & Maternity allowance
Iceland	1946						Y	
	1954				N			
			20 (industry);				Y; 80% of earnings in	
Italy	1950	8	16 (agriculture); 14 (other)	Y	Y	Y	private sector; lump-sum in agriculture	
Japan	1947	5			Y	Y		
Netherlands	1966	8	10	Y	Y		Y	
Norway	1956	6	12	N	Y	Y	•	
Portugal	1963		8.6			•	Y; 100%	Maternity reserve funds
	1966		8.6	•		Y	Y; 100%	Maternity reserve funds
Spain	1966						Y;75%	Social security system
Sweden	1955		24				Y	
	1963		24				Y;80%	
Turkey	1950	3	6	Y	Y		Y	
	1967	3	6	Y	Y		Y;66%	
UK	1948		13			N	Y	Maternity allowances
	1953		18			N	Y	Maternity allowances

 $Sources: Harris\ (1919)\ and\ OECD\ Family\ Database,\ "PF2.5\ Annex:\ Detail\ of\ Change\ in\ Parental\ Leave\ Policy,"\ www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
country	Maximum job- protected leave for mothers (weeks)	Total maternity leave (weeks)	Pre-birth leave (% maternity leave)	Total <i>paid</i> leave available to mothers (weeks)	Average Payment Rate for Mothers (% of average, 2014, national earnings)	Total paid leave available to father (% total paid leave for both parents)	Early childhood education and care (%GDP)	Accumulate days off /vary start/end of daily work (% companies)
Poland	203.67	26	8	52	80	4	0.5	43.97
Spain	166	16	63	16	100	12	0.6	34.07
Slovak Republic	164	34	24	164	32.0	0	0.4	54.49
Czech Republic	162	28	21	110	51.1	0	0.4	59.64
France	162	16	38	42 / 110	44.7	40 / 33	1.2	54.29
Germany	162	14	43	58Slovak Re	epublic 164	34	24	164

